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Abstract 
This thesis extends the research of stock price comovements in two dimensions. We 
test whether there are asymmetric patterns of stock price comovements in rising and 
falling markets, and investigate the relationship between corporate governance and stock 
price comovements. 
Firstly, we use the fraction of stocks that move in the same direction in a market in a 
week as a measure of comovements to see whether stock price comovements in up and 
down markets are different. Using a sample of 45 economies, we find evidence that in 
most economies the comovement of stock prices is more prominent in down-markets, 
especially in down-markets with extreme market movements, than in up markets. 
Secondly, employing a sample of listed firms in 22 markets of Western Europe and 
East Asia, we find evidence showing that corporate governance can explain the variation 
in price comovement behavior among stocks to a certain extent. One significant result is 
that firm-level synchronicity decreases with ownership concentration in the sample of 
Western Europe. It suggests that concentrated ownership alleviates the conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers, improves the firm-specific information 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
People have been curious about why stock prices move together so often. Studies 
document that the constituent stocks of S&P500 often move together (e.g. Shliefer, 
2000). Morck，Yeung and Yu (2000) recorded that, "[i]n emerging markets like China, 
Malaysia and Poland, over 80% of stock often move in the same direction in a given 
week’，i . Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) find "excess" comovement of return remains in 
a portfolio of stocks in completely different lines of business after controlling for any 
cash-flow or discount rate correlation induced by news about future macroeconomic 
conditions. These phenomena are interesting since empirical evidence shows that the 
view from proponents of efficient market hypothesis is insufficient to explain this 
puzzling phenomenon. Specifically, comovement in news about the fundamental value 
of stocks can only explain stock price comovements in part. The literature finds that 
trading activities of institutional investors and the sentiment or irrational trading 
behavior of investors could also cause stock price comovements. 
The research on stock price comovements has important implications for academic 
finance as well as investment practice. Understanding stock price comovements helps us 
understand the functioning of financial markets. Recently, in an influential model 
regarding noise trader risk in financial markets, stock price comovement is an important 
assumption as well as a result of the model: 
"The third major assumption we make is that noise trader risk is systematic: 
it affects either the market as a whole or a significant segment of traded 
securities. If noise trader risk on each asset were purely idiosyncratic, it 
1 They are describing the data of the first 26 weeks in 1995. 
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would not be priced in equilibrium. The necessity of noise trader risk being 
systematic for it to be priced implies that the securities influenced by noise 
trader sentiment have correlated returns. This would be the case even if 
these securities were fundamentally uncorrelated, and the only common 
influence on their prices was noise trader demand. This observation 
generates a very sharp prediction: fundamentally unrelated securities 
subject to the same noise trader sentiment must observably move together，， 
(Shleifer, 2000, p.42). 
This thesis extends the research of stock price comovements in two dimensions. 
We test whether there are asymmetric patterns of stock price comovements in rising and 
falling markets and investigate the relationship between corporate governance and stock 
prices comovements. 
Asymmetric Patterns of Stock Prices Comovements 
Recent research reveals several asymmetric patterns in financial markets and investor 
behavior that we used to regard them as symmetric. For example, Odean (1998) found 
that there is a tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning 
investments too soon; McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley (1996) documented that cross-
autocorrelation is asymmetric in up and down markets. We speculate that there appears 
an asymmetry of stock price comovements in up and down markets. Stock prices 
comove more in down-falling markets. 
To test our speculation, we use the fraction of stocks that move in the same 
direction in a market as a measure of comovement to see whether stock price 
comovements in up and down markets are different. Our sample contains forty-five 
economies. The results turn out to be satisfactory since a number of economies in our 
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sample show a weak asymmetry, and almost no economy shows that the stock prices 
comove more in up-rising markets. 
Stock price comovements are suggested to be related to market sentiment and 
(rational and irrational) herding among investors as many studies suggested. Stimulated 
by Chang, Cheng and Khorana's (2002) study, we suspect that the asymmetry is more 
salient during dramatic market falls. We also test this conjecture, and find evidence 
supporting this speculation. 
A common conjecture by regulators is that short selling restrictions can reduce the 
severity of a market panic. Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2002) find that the lifting of short-
sales restrictions is associated with increased negative skewness in individual stock 
returns. As we saw in Shliefer's statement above, stock movements are probably not 
independent; short sales restrictions may reduce not only negative skewness of stock 
return, but also reduce the stock price comovements in the crashes. We tentatively test 
this hypothesis, and find supportive evidence. 
Corporate governance and stock price comovements 
In recent years, corporate governance has received much attention, partly due to the 
Asian Financial Crisis. While poor corporate governance may not have directly 
triggered the Crisis, the poor corporate governance practices in East Asia could have 
made the countries suffer more severe crises once it began. (Mitton, 2002) 
Corporate governance refers to the rules of games that enable investors to protect 
their entitled rights. It has important effects on financial markets since investments in 
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securities normally only happen when an investor is convinced that his rights are well 
protected. Recent studies provide evidence supporting this notion such as Claessens et al. 
(2002), Faccio, Lang and Yeung (2001) and Mitton (2002). 
In a ground-breaking paper, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) found that variations in 
investor rights protection could explain the difference in the comovement of stock prices 
across countries. If investor rights protection is a significant determinant of stock price 
comovements, then corporate governance (investor protection at the corporate level) 
should also explain cross-stock difference in price comovements. 
We believe that corporate governance and stock price comovements are linked by 
the disclosure of corporate information. Transparency of corporations is an important 
element of corporate governance�Poor information disclosure enlarges the asymmetry 
of information between insiders (managers/ controlling shareholders) and outside 
investors (creditors and shareholders). As a result, insiders are more likely to expropriate 
outside investors. Transparency of corporations is also important for asset pricing. 
Disclosure of current and past financial results and business operations is important to 
this process. Low predictability of the prospects of corporations with poor disclosure 
quality probably causes them to comove more frequently with the market. 
To assess this potential relationship, we perform regression analysis using a sample 
with listed firms of thirteen Western European economies and nine East Asian 
economies in 1996. We test whether corporate ownership structure, one key component 
of corporate governance, have an effect on our firm-level synchronicity measure (how 
often a stock moves with the market). 
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It is interesting to compare corporations in Western Europe and those in East Asia. 
First, weak corporate governance is suggested to be one of the causes of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. This reflects the generally inadequate corporate governance system in 
East Asia. Second, in terms of corporate ownership, continental European countries and 
East Asian economies share a similarity that family-owned firms are the dominant 
corporate ownership pattern, while corporate ownership in UK, Ireland and Japan is 
more dispersed. Finally, the financial market institutions (e.g. equity market regulations, 
accounting system) in Western Europe are generally regarded as effective, while those 
in East Asia are usually regarded as inefficient. 
One significant result is that the firm-level synchronicity decreases with ownership 
concentration in the sample of Western Europe. It suggests that concentrated ownership 
alleviates the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, improves the 
information disclosure of a corporation, and thus reduces the tendency of stock price 
comoving with the market. Some of our results, with caveats in interpretation, are 
aligned with findings of two recent pieces of research. First, investor rights protection 
will reduce firm-level synchronicity only in countries with substantial general property 
rights protection that ensures the protection is exercisable. Second, debt plays different 
roles in corporate governance depending on the financial market institutions. Debt 
constrains expropriation in economies with effective market institutions, while debt 
facilitates expropriation in markets with ineffective market institutions. 
Organization of the thesis 
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The next chapter overviews the literature of asset returns comovements. Chapter 3 
reports our findings on the asymmetric patterns of comovements in up and down 
markets while chapter 4 presents the results of tests detecting the relationship between 
corporate governance and stock price comovements. Chapter 5 summarizes the major 
findings and provides concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Literature on asset returns documents numerous patterns of return comovements in 
capital markets. Studies found a strong common factor in the returns of small-cap stocks, 
returns on value stocks, closed end funds, stocks in the same industry and similar bonds 
(Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2002, BSW hereafter). These interesting phenomena 
attract substantial research attention. This chapter first reviews the prevailing theories of 
stock price comovements, which sheds light on our study. Next, recent research often 
attributes stock price comovements to herding behavior among investors. These studies 
are also reviewed. The last part of this chapter discusses recent research on the focus of 
this paper: the synchronous^ stock price movement in national exchanges. 
2.1 Views on Comovements 
BSW summarize three main views of the asset price comovements: fundamentals-based 
comovements, category-based comovements and habitat-based comovements. 
(1) Fundamentals-based comovements 
Based on efficient market hypothesis, asset price should be always close to if not 
equal to the risk-adjusted discounted value of future cash flows of an asset provided that 
capital markets are frictionless and the trading of irrational agents is insignificant in the 
pricing process. Any comovement therefore is the result of comovements in news about 
fundamental values. Despite the appealing theoretical reasoning, empirical evidence 
challenges this view. For example, Royal Dutch and Shell stocks, listed in the 
2 In this thesis, "comovement" and "synchronous movement" are used interchangeably. 
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Netherlands and the UK respectively, have almost the same risk and return structure, but 
their prices are always not in parity. Two substitutable assets do not exhibit 
comovements; rather each of them tends to move more frequently with its local market 
(Shleifer, 2000). The fundamentals view seems to be insufficient in explaining 
comovements in financial markets. 
(2) Category-based comovements 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) proposed that many investors first group assets into 
categories when forming their portfolios and then allocate funds at the level of these 
various categories instead of at the individual asset level. In an inefficient market, 
correlated shifts of demand can cause changes in asset prices. If investors are noise 
traders with correlated sentiment, the coordinated demand induced by reallocation 
among categories will induce common factors in the returns of the assets that happen to 
be classified into the same category. Category investment is particularly attractive to 
institutional investors, who are used to following systematic rules in their portfolio 
allocation. This investment strategy simplifies the investment process, and also provides 
a consistent way of evaluating the performance of money managers. (BSW) 
(3) Habitat-based comovements 
Observations indicate that many investors are used to trading only a subset of all 
securities. It is suggested that those preferred habitats might arise because of 
transactions costs, international trading restrictions, or lack of information. When these 
investors alter their exposures to the securities in their habitat due to changes in 
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sentiment or degree of risk aversion, their correlated demand shifts can induce a 
common factor in the returns of these securities. (BSW) 
BSW point out that their arguments for category-based comovements and habitat-
based comovements rely on the assumption of limits to arbitrage. This assumption is 
believed to be valid in financial markets around the world and it is supported by 
empirical evidence. In most markets, the unavailability of perfect substitutable assets for 
hedging, short horizon of arbitrageurs, and the presence of noise traders put constraints 
on the widely practised arbitrage activity. 
2.2 Herding 
In general, herding could be defined as behavioral patterns that are correlated across 
individuals. However, correlated purchases or sales of stocks could just be a result of 
correlated news arrival to independently acting investors. 'Herding' is often restricted to 
mean correlated behaviors which can lead to systematic erroneous decision-making by 
the entire population. Herding requires a coordination mechanism. It can be either a 
widely spread rule to coordinate based on some signal or based on a direct ability to 
observe other decision-makers. (Devenow & Welch，1996) 
Studies often divide herding into non-rational herding and rational herding. "The 
non-rational view centers on investor psychology and holds that agents behave like 
lemmings, following one another blindly and foregoing rational analysis... The rational 
view centers on externalities, optimal decision-making being distorted by information 
difficulties or incentive issues. The intermediate view holds that decision-makers are 
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near-rational, economizing on information processing or information acquisition costs 
by using 'heuristics', and that rational activities by third-parties cannot eliminate this 
influence." (Devenow & Welch, 1996) 
Studies suggest that individuals are more likely to suppress their own beliefs in 
favor of market consensus during periods of extreme market movement. To detect the 
existence of herding behavior, Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) follow Christine and 
Huang (1995) and use the relative strength of comovements of a market to that predicted 
by the asset-pricing model during periods of extreme market movement. They found no 
evidence of herding on the part of market participants in the US and Hong Kong and 
partial evidence of herding in Japan, while South Korea and Taiwan, the two emerging 
markets in their sample, provide significant evidence of herding. 
2.3 Stock Price Synchronicity of a Market 
The development of financial system is crucial in the economic advancement. Financial 
system mobilizes scarce capital in a society and lower transactions costs. A sound 
financial system promotes effective use of scarce capital in an economy. One important 
function of financial markets is providing informational efficiency, that is, efficiency in 
conveying information to the public and corporations. Asset prices signal to the market 
3 Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2002) do not use the terms "comovement" or "synchronicity". They focus 
on "dispersion". Their measure considers the absolute dispersions of an individual equity return and the 
overall market return. We find that this concept is consistent with stock price comovements. Actually, 
there is some ambiguity in the use of the term "comovement". Some papers consider direction of return 
(positive or negative) solely; and others consider both direction and magnitude at the same time; that is, 
two assets move with low degree of synchronicity when one asset price rises dramatically while the other 
rises slightly. In the literature review, two concepts are not distinguished attentively. In our own analyses, 
comovement means asset prices move together in the same direction (rise or fall). 
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the intrinsic value of a corporation and provide corporations with measures of 
managerial performance that cannot be obtained from accounting data. 
In order to study the informational efficiency, Morck, Yeung and Yu (MYY, 2000) 
introduce the synchronicity of a market as a measure of informational efficiency of stock 
markets. This measure is based on their observation that stock prices move together 
more in poor countries than in rich countries. 
"As the voluminous literature on the efficient market theory suggests, there is no 
universal test for relative market efficiency, although event studies and filter rules have 
a long history of application. An important recent contribution to the literature on 
market efficiency is MYY's observation that more efficient markets can be expected to 
have more idiosyncratic risk, since the ratio of firm-specific information to market-level 
information is likely to be higher in informational environments that allow market 
participants to acquire information and act quickly and inexpensively upon it." (Bris, 
Goetzmann and Zhu, 2002’ BGZ hereafter) 
The efficient market paradigm describes stock price changes as arising from (1) 
unpredictable movements in pervasive economic factors, (2) unpredictable changes in a 
firm's market environment, i.e., industry information, and (3) events specific to the firm 
itself. (Roll, 1988) Roughly speaking, there are market-wide information and firm-
specific information leading to the movement of stock prices*. MYY argue that market-
4 The effect of industry information on the synchronicity measure of a market is not very clear in the 
literature. We provide two possible effects of industry information here. We expect high stock price 
comovements in a market where listed corporations are concentrated in a few industries; we also expect 
high stock price comovements in a market where listed corporations are in industries highly dependent on 
each other. 
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wide information is more observable than firm-specific information, as firm-specific 
information is often retained in the hands of corporate insiders. Less efficient markets 
are not successful in conveying firm-specific information to the market. Movements of 
stock prices in these markets are more often induced by the arrival of market news, 
which affects all firms. Hence, stocks move together more in less informationally 
efficient markets. 
They introduced two country-level synchronicity measures. One measures the 
fraction of stocks that move in the same direction with the market. The other one, based 
on the traditional asset pricing model, measures the proportion of variation of a stock，s 
price explained by the market. The first one, f j ’ is a measure of the fraction of stocks 
that move in the same direction in a country. First，the following terms are calculated 
/y, - ^up.do.^ ^ LU.�“J， y^) 
'''jt 卞广 
where nj ( n广 ) i s the number of stocks in country j whose prices rise (fall) in week t. 
Then average t h e / s across years for each country, 
1 • m a x [ � r ] 1 
f j 二 《；《观=jl^fp e [0.5，1]， （2) 
where Tis the number of periods used. MYY drop those stocks whose prices do not 
move to avoid bias due to non-trading. The second measure is based on the insight that 
more co-movement to a certain extent implies more systematic risk. They regress stock 
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returns on the value-weighted market return for every firm i and in every year, and get 
the r2. First, R^s (adjusted R^) of the following regressions are obtained^. 
G 二 a, + + PiA^us, + Cjt ] + 忘u • (3) 
where r^ is the individual stock's bi-weekly return, r � . , i s the local market return and 
rus.t is the market return of the US. R measures the portion of variation in a stock's 
return that can be explained by the market factor. R^s are then averaged for each country 
, Y R ^ X SST.. 
J and for every year T, R]=卞綱， � 
where SST is the sum of squares in regression (3). Logistic transformations of f j and Rj 
are often used in order to facilitate statistical analyses, i.e., xj/j = l o g ( 4 ^ ) e land 
/ \ I 
—ogl j i i f 尸丨• 
2.4 Comparison of Two Popular Measures of Stock Price Synchronicity 
These two measures, Jj and 及,，to some extent share the same idea and are highly 
correlated empirically. Distinct features do exist between them. Firstly, the information 
contained in the magnitude of price movements is discarded in the construction of f j , but 
this could be important. For example, a stock rising relatively lesser than the average in 
a boom market may be a sign that both good market-wide news and bad firm-specific 
news arrive at the market at the same time. Secondly, stocks with negative beta more 
5 MYY include the U.S. stock market returns in eq. (3) because they believe that most economies are at 
least partially open to foreign capital. Not all literature follows this practice, such as BGZ. Including U.S. 
stock market return may be risky, since R s^ of eq. (3) no longer depends on the explanatory power of 
market returns solely, and the meaning of ^ s is blurred. 
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often move in an opposite direction in responding to market-wide shocks due to its anti-
cyclical business nature. A high F^ of negative beta stocks does not necessarily mean 
that the stock moves with the market. Thirdly, the information of zero stock return is 
included in the calculation of R^ but not in f j . On one hand, prices of illiquid stocks often 
keep constant due to non-trading; f j can avoid the non-trading bias in these cases. On 
the other hand, zero return can indicate that the market is confident about the prospects 
of the company and ignores the current macroeconomic shocks. Finally, the value-
weighted market return used in the calculation of R] in Eq.3 is controversial. On one 
hand, it is generally accepted that the value-weighted market return can represent the 
fundamentals of an economy. On the other hand, this practice may not be aligned with 
the original idea of the synchronicity. Several heavily weighted stocks will dominate the 
market return in small markets. Low F^ could be obtained even most stocks are moving 
together in cases where the dominant stocks move opposite to the rest of the market. 
2.5 Factors Affecting Synchronicity of a Market 
It is believed that we can understand more about the functioning and the underlying 
mechanisms of a capital market through the study of factors that have an impact on the 
stock price comovements, a proxy for the relative efficiency of a capital market. Here, 
we briefly discuss factors that have been explored. 
(i) Market size. Synchronicity, as a measure, has its deficiency. It is greatly 
influenced by the number of constituent stocks. For a market with fewer stocks 
should exhibit a higher degree of synchronicity since each stock is a larger fraction of 
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the market portfolio. For f j , a market with fewer stocks is probably providing higher J} by 
the law of large number. Analogous to the experiment of flapping coins, when we flap 
two fair coins, the probability of getting both tails and both heads is half. In another case, 
the probability of getting the outcome of either all tails or all heads when flapping five 
thousand fair coins is nearly zero. 
(ii) Economic fundamentals —  any factors that cause the fundamental values of 
firms to commove, for example, the stability of macroeconomic policies, diversification 
of industries of an economy, and geographically concentrated economic activity. 
Fluctuations in market environment and economic policy naturally lead to higher 
variation in the market value of stocks. Economic activity in small countries is often 
localized; any localized environmental catastrophes might have market-wide impacts. 
Large countries with various endowments are easier to achieve industrial diversification, 
and are expected to have a lower degree of stock prices comovements. 
(iii) Institutional strength. 
1) Property rights protection and investor rights protection. High stock price 
comovements is found to be associated with weak property rights protection. (MYY) In 
MYY's paper, stock return synchronicity is significantly negatively correlated with the 
proxies of institutional integrity (the protectiveness of the property rights). Furthermore, 
the effect of income level becomes insignificant when variables related to property 
rights protection are added into the regression. In their interpretation, high stock price 
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comovements in poor countries are a consequence of poor protection of property rights, 
but not the poverty itself^. 
MYY link investor protection with stock price comovements from the perspective 
of the availability of arbitrage. Risk arbitrage is important in the process of capitalizing 
information into share prices. Active informed arbitrage traders gather information and 
bring them into the market through their self-interest-motivated actions. As firm-specific 
information is usually independent, stock prices move more asynchronously in markets 
with active informed arbitrageurs. 
In markets without proper property rights protection, informed arbitrage may be 
hardly profitable because of unpredictable business environment. In such countries, 
politics often have great influence on corporate sector: unanticipated licensing, contracts 
repudiation, not fully compensated nationalization, and political struggles determine the 
fate of a corporation^. Moreover, expropriations from managers or controlling 
shareholders also pose threats. In such scenarios, future cash flow of an investment, 
including stocks, is highly unpredictable. Informed arbitrage is inactive and thus noise 
6 BGZ have replicated the work of MYY, but not all the results consistent with those of MYY. "In [BGZ's] 
analysis, [they] replicate as closely as possible the estimation and control variables used in MYY... 
Despite [the significant difference of the sample in time and cross-section], we generally confirm the 
MYY finding that countries with higher GDP per capita display lower stock price synchronicity... The 
good government index is also statistically significant, with two caveats: (i) the coefficient displays 
different signs depending on the specification, and (ii) the GDP per capita does not become insignificant 
once the good government index is introduced in the regression.(BGZ). That is poverty itself might 
have an effect on stock price comovement. Some studies suggest that the difference in income level can 
affect investor behavior. Some claim that the behavior of wealthy investors and that of "poor" investors 
are quite different. Having ability to diversify their portfolio and having less liquidity constraint, "rich" 
investors are usually more patient and more often make decisions based on rational reasons. By contrast, 
"poor" investors, without those edges, often view the stock market as a casino and invest based on beliefs. 
In this way, herding behavior is more salient in stock markets dominated by "poor" investors. See Lin 
(1996). 
7 See, for example, Johnson and Mitton (2002)� 
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traders dominate the stock market. Noise trading, in turn, creates additional risk and 
drives informed traders out of market^. As a result, stocks move together more in 
markets where property rights are ill protected. 
2) Freedom of information flow — informational opacity of a market. In an 
opaque stock market, accurate firm-specific information is not accessible and, thus, 
good and bad firms are indistinguishable. Chen (2003) suggests that it may be optimal 
for investors to bet on the market, rather than put their money based on unreliable firm-
specific information. Moreover, when the analysis of corporate information is useless 
for gaining profit, following rumors or technical analysis may be a rational strategy. 
High synchronicity in such markets is no surprise. 
Freedom of press is a key element in ensuring transparency of a market. Chen 
(2002) classifies 40 countries into 3 groups according to their degree of protection of 
press freedom. Chen finds that the average synchronicity for the counties with the 
highest degree of protection is 64.1%; that for the group with average protection is 
66.8%, and 71% for the group with the least protection. More interventions on the press 
reduce the efficiency of a market. In addition, one feature of countries with poor 
property rights protection is that some interest groups in the society, such as 
governments, elite groups, religious organizations, merchandises and labor unions, can 
o . The informed arbitrage argument is appealing, but other possibilities are also worth considering. For 
example, innovative and creative industries could hardly be developed in economies without good 
property rights protection since pirate is serious. Such industries are thought to have a higher firm-specific 
risk as they depend on the idea generation of its staff. In this way, countries with poor property right 
protection exhibit higher stock comovements as a result of lack of innovative and creative industries. In 
reality, we observe that routine assembly manufacturing rather than industries depending on R&D or 
complex managerial skills dominate the industry sector of such countries. 
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abuse their rights regardless of the interests of other people. Freedom of press put 
constrains on such interest groups, which is an important part of institutional integrity. 
Chen's argument is different from that of MYY to some extent. He suggests that 
the firm-specific information cannot flow into the market, while MYY suggest that noise 
trading impedes utilizing firm-specific information even if the market can access the 
information. Chen's idea also provides insights on the relationship between institutional 
investors and stock price comovements. In relatively efficient markets, the presence of 
institutional investors possibly increases the comovements of stock prices within the 
market as they are suggested to be responsible for the category-based comovements and 
habitat-based comovements. On the other hand, institutional investors, who have less 
liquidity constraints and more advantage in performing hedging, are most likely to be 
informed arbitrageurs, thereby reducing the synchronicity of the whole market. 
iv) Laws and regulations. Government interventions and regulations are regarded 
as a determinant of the efficiency of a market. BGZ have investigated the relationship 
between short-selling restrictions and stock price comovements. They employ data from 
forty-seven equity markets around the world and find more firm-specific variation in 
markets where short selling is feasible and practiced. More importantly, they also found 
a clear reduction in the degree of synchronicity for countries lifting the short sale 
restrictions in their sample period. 
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Chapter 3 Asymmetric Patterns of Stock Price Comovements 
In inefficient capital markets, price movements are not necessarily caused by changes in 
the expectation of intrinsic value of stocks. Demand shifts for securities in a given 
category, or by demand shifts of specific investors can also cause price changes. (BSW) 
Therefore, the movement can depend on trading of institutional investors and noise 
trader sentiment. 
Recently, studies suggest that investors make decisions differently when facing 
different conditions. For example, Odean (1998) found that there is a tendency of 
investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, i.e., 
investors behave differently when facing gains and losses. As Shleifer (2000) makes it 
clear, the standard decision making model does not capture features of human decision 
making in a number of fundamental areas. He grouped these areas into three broad 
categories: attitudes toward risk, non-Bayesian expectation formation, and sensitivity of 
decision making to the framing of problem. (Shleifer, 2000, p. 10) 
3.1 Rationale for Asymmetric Patterns of Stock Price Comovements 
Investor behavior may be also different when they are in a rising market and falling 
market. Several studies give us some clues that there may be asymmetric patterns of 
stock price comovements in up and down markets. 
3.1.1 Difference in the Delay in Response to Bad News and Good News 
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McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley (MPT, 1996) documented that cross-autocorrelation is 
asymmetric in up and down markets. In order to investigate the correlation between the 
return on a portfolio of large stocks and the lagged return on a portfolio of small stocks, 
MPT estimate the following equation (eq. 5) using monthly returns of common stocks 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from January 1963 to December 1994. 
St � N { O J i t \ h t = n ” i s l \ (5) 
The smallest size stock portfolio monthly return ( ri，t) is regressed on the 
concurrent (〜）and lagged (,5“-1) the returns of largest stock portfolio. The result is 
r” 二 -0.001 + U6O5“ + 0.2915 卜 1 + . 
And after including binary variables to allow the parameters to differ when the market is 
up (rs > 0) or down (rs < 0), they obtain =0.954, y^�侧=1.413，严=0.418 and 
pfN = - 0.079, and the hypotheses that p f 二 p f and JS^ p^ =仗n ^re rejected at the 
0.001 level. 
We are not interested in the lagged betas but their finding about an asymmetry in 
concurrent betas. They find that when the market return is positive (good 
macroeconomic news arrive in the market in their interpretation), the small stock 
portfolio has a concurrent calculated beta of only 0.954. However, the down-market beta 
is 1.413. Suppose most stocks have positive betas, we might interpret the result as small 
stocks and large stocks (most stocks) move more together when the market is down. 
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Furthermore, they find that the asymmetry is offsetting. When they allow for a 
concurrent and a one-month delayed response to good news by summing up 广 + P^^, 
the up-market small stock beta increase to a more reasonable estimate of 1.372 
(0.954+0.418). This estimate is very close to the sum of the concurrent and lagged betas 
in down markets of 1.334 (1.413-0.079). They argue that this evidence and the results of 
other tests suggest that all stocks react quickly to negative macroeconomic news, but 
that some small stocks adjust to positive news about the economy with a delay (MPT). 
In their study, weekly data are used as well. Evidence suggests that some small 
stocks respond with a delay to both good and bad news, but the delay to bad news is at 
most a week or two, while the delay to good news can be much longer. The difference in 
the delay in response can cause asymmetric pattern in comovements^. Besides the US 
market, Biais et al. (1999) also found evidence that a market with short-sales constraints 
reflects good news significantly faster than bad news by analyzing data from the Paris 
Bourse (BGZ). 
MPT conclude that ‘‘[their] finding of directional asymmetry is compatible with the 
empirical findings of Grinblatt, Timan, and Wermers (1995) and Keim and Madhavan 
(1995). Grinblatt, Timan, and Wermers (1995)1�find that mutual fund managers follow 
momentum investment strategies only after good news— buying past winners but not 
9 If difference in the delay in responses to market-wide information can cause asynchronic movements, it 
raises questions to our fundamental assumption that asynchronic movements imply firm-specific 
information reaching the market. 
10 Grinblatt, M.，S. Timan, and R. Wermers ,1995, Momentum investment strategies, portfolio 
performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior, American Economic Review 85, 1088-1105. 
Keim, D., A. Madhavan ,1995, Anatomy of the trading process: Empirical evidence on the behavior of 
institutional traders, Journal of Financial Economics 37，371-398. 
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selling past losers. Keim and Madhavan (1995) find that institutions' "motivation for the 
trade decision is often not symmetric for buys versus sells.” Furthermore, they find that 
institutions typically place smaller buy orders that take longer to execute relative to sell 
orders. One possible story consistent with [their] findings is that investors attempt to sell 
all stocks quickly when news of the economy is bad. When the news is good, the market 
participants quickly buy large, easy to price stocks but take their time and "shop around" 
before buying smaller, more volatile stocks." (MPT) 
3.1.2 Other Possible Reasons for Asymmetric Patterns of Stock Price 
Comovement^ ^  
The argument that the lesser delay in response to bad news than good news in the 
market leads us to suspect that there exist an asymmetry in comovements, such that 
comovements become more salient in the down markets. Besides this argument, there 
are other indirect clues leading stock price comovements to exhibit asymmetric patterns 
in up-rising and down-falling markets. 
It is a common conjecture the speculators exploit the sentiment of fear during 
market falls. Many said that speculative short selling aggravates market crashes. BGZ 
1， 
cite a related research paper by Hong and Stein (2003) , in which they develop a 
heterogeneous agent model linking short-sales constraints to market crashes. “In their 
model, if some investors are constrained from selling short, their accumulated 
1，Many arguments here are extended from Shliefer (2000) and Lin (1996). 
12 Hong, Harrison and Jeremy C. Stein (2003), "Differences of Opinion, Short-Sales Constraints, and 
Market Crashes," The Review of Financial Studies, 16(2), pp. 487-525(39). 
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unrevealed negative information will not be manifest until the market begins to drop, 
which further aggravates market declines and leads to a crash. They motivate the model 
with the observation that the U.S. market displays negative skewness." (BGZ) 
Problems in information flow will also cause asymmetric pattern of stock price 
comovements. There is information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside 
investors. It is somewhat hard for outside investors to evaluate the firm's prospects. As 
mentioned in chapter 2，many stock markets are opaque where it is even harder for 
outside investors to distinguish good firms from bad ones. Once there is rumor 
spreading in such markets, markets go into panic as everyone loses confidence in the 
firms; everyone in the market rushes to sell out his stockholdings. In up markets, 
investors are more patient to seek good timing of taking profits, as the loss of investment 
opportunity would not reduces his initial wealth as long as the stock price keeps the 
upward trend. 
Theories suggest that the price rises and price falls are asymmetric. There are 
mechanisms that accelerate the price falls. Such mechanisms may somehow catalyze the 
formation of asymmetry in stock price comovements. One of them is liquidity constraint 
of investors. Liquidity constraints force the individual investors who are subject to 
liquidity constraints to give up their portfolios even though they foresee the positive 
long-term prospects. Their investment horizon is typically short. Not only individual 
investors, even institutional investors usually have short investment horizons. "The 
assumption that arbitrageurs have short horizons is essential to limit arbitrage in the case 
where securities have perfect substitutes. This assumption can be justified in a number 
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of ways. Most arbitrageurs do not manage their own money, but are agents for investors. 
Investors evaluate arbitrageurs at regular, relatively short intervals and pay them 
according to their performance. Mispricings that take longer than the evaluation 
horizon^^ to correct do not increase arbitrageur's pay, and the deepening of such 
mispricings actually reduces it. Moreover, many arbitrageurs borrow money and 
securities from intermediaries to put on their trades. They have to pay interest on this 
money, but also face the risk of liquidation by the lenders if prices move against them 
and the value of collateral falls." (Shleifer, 2000, p. 29) In addition, many stock 
exchanges have set maintenance margin requirements, which liquidation is involuntarily 
exercised. 
Another mechanism is chain reaction caused by stop-loss order and computer 
trading in crashes. To stop further losses from accumulating, many investors and 
computer trading rules place (explicit or implicit) stop-loss orders, by which the stock is 
to be sold if its price falls below a stipulated level. When stocks prices fall suddenly, the 
fall may trigger some stop-loss orders and, in turn, push the prices downward further. 
3.2 Detecting Asymmetric Pattern in Comovements 
The above arguments are far from mature. In this chapter, we detect whether there is any 
asymmetric pattern of comovements without asserting any particular rationale behind it. 
In Section 3.1，several arguments are related to extreme market movements. It is a 
common conjecture that dramatic market movements can change the sentiment of 
13 One possible reason for the long time mispricings is noise trader risk. (See Shleifer, 2000) 
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market participants. Following Christie and Huang (1995), Chang, Cheng and Khorana 
(2002) argue that if market participants suppress their own predictions about asset prices 
(a kind of herding behavior) during periods of large market movements and base their 
investment decisions solely on aggregate market behavior, individual asset returns will 
not diverge substantially from the overall market behavior. In other words, herding 
behavior is more prominent during the periods of large market movements. 
The possible effects of margin requirements, short selling of speculators, and herd 
instinct among investors make us speculate that the asymmetry would be more 
prominent when market moves are extremely large, especially when the market is down. 
In this chapter, we try to detect whether there is any asymmetric pattern of stock 
price comovements and related issues. Specifically, (1) we are going to detect whether 
there is an asymmetric pattern of stock price comovements in stock markets around the 
world; (2) the margin trading argument may suggest that this asymmetry is more 
prominent when the market drops dramatically. Also, we try to detect any link between 
asymmetry and extreme market downward movement. 
To perform our detections, we construct a measure similar to that of MYY. We 
calculate the fraction of stocks that move in the same direction in a country each week t. 
Recall equation (1)，厂 二 max|>;f’w广]^  [0 51], and directly take the logistic transformation 
卞"jt 
without averaging the measure across time. We denote the transformed variable as Itf’ 
I. (6) 
For each country, there are around 52 observations each year. 
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Itf displays a bell shape experimental distribution. For illustration, the histograms of 
Itf for Japan, US^ "^  and the world (all countries in our sample) for the whole sample 
period are shown in Figure 1. Although the null hypothesis of normality test is rejected 
in certain c a s e s w e determine that it is appropriate to employ /-statistics for 
conducting hypothesis testing as the 广test is regarded as a good approximation even in 
the absence of normality if the population distributions are single peaked and the sample 
sizes of groups are roughly equal16. 
[Insert figure 1 here: 
In the first part of our analysis, we employ t-test to see whether there is a difference 
between the expected Itfm the up markets (denoted as Itf^) and in the down markets 
(denoted as Itf^^), The null hypothesis states that the two means are equal, i.e., E(ltf^) 
=E(lt/醒),while the alternative hypothesis states that the two means are not equal^^, 
14 They are the two largest markets in terms of number of stocks in our sample. 
15 Skewness-kurtosis tests for ///"^ and It/�侧 of each economy for the whole sample period are reported in 
Appendix Table 1. 
16 The statement in the reference is originally discussing ANOVA，"Statisticians have shown that 
[ANOVA] is relatively unaffected by the lack of normality when the population distributions are single-
peaked and the sample sizes [of groups] are roughly equal" (Morse, 1993, p.504). As the two tailed /-test 
and ANOVA F-test with two groups are more or less the same, we regard this statement as applicable to t-
tests. 
17 With an assumption that the sample coming from up-markets and down-markets in a country are 
independent, the expression of t-statistic for unpaired data with equal variance assumption is 
Eiltf"')- Eiltf^^) ’ where s^ up {s^ doyvr) is the sample variance of Itf^ (It/�糊、and (w"�"*^ ”) is the 
number of weeks of up-markets (down-markets). And the expression of t-statistic for unpaired data with 
unequal variance assumption is ^ _ ’ where / is the pooled estimate of the common 
一 
population variance. Based on a sample variance s^ up from a sample of size w"^ , and a sample variance 
s2如抓 from a sample of size w办抓，given by: 一 = . Bartlett's ？ test is_used for 
testing equal variance (See Hamilton (1998) for details). We reject the hypothesis of equal variances as 
the p-value of the Bartlett's test is less than 0.10. 
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Data of US stock market show that percent of stocks moving together fluctuate 
vigorously although the downward trend is clear from 1926 to 1995/8 To avoid bias due 
to the time factor, our comparisons will be conducted for both time series pooled sample 
and for individual year as well. 
In the second part of the analysis, to detect the possibility that the asymmetry is 
more prominent during extreme downward market movements, we regress the 
synchronicity measure on dummies that capture (1) the effect of up- and down- markets, 
(2) the effect of extreme market movement, and (3) their interaction. That is, the 
following model is estimated: 
ltf.=a + + b^extreme _ value^ + b^up^ * extrem _ value^ + e.， (7) 
where upi is a dummy variable which equals 1 (0) if the market moves up (down); 
extreme一value equals 1 (0) if the absolute value of the weekly market return is in the 
90出 percentile (otherwise). bi is also detecting the effect of up and down markets on 
synchronicity as in the previous section. We expect bi to be negative for most markets. 
Extreme value and comovements by construction are highly correlated, and thus b � i s 
expected to be positive. The interaction term, bs, is expected to be negative. 
3.2.1 Data Construction and Descriptions 
Weekly stock prices^^ for calculating stock returns begin with stocks covered by the 
Datastream information services. To ensure the consistency, stock price information of 
Figure 2 of MYY is a plot displaying the fraction of the United States stocks that move together in a 
given month over the period 1926 to 1995. 19 Price is called "Price index，，in Datastrem. Its definition is displayed in Appendix Table 3. 
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44 markets (listed in table 1) comes from a subset of Datastream: Datastream Company 
Account Services. The United States stock market often serves as benchmark in the 
literature. Since we cannot find the US stock list in the Company Account subset, we use 
the list of S&P1500 as a substitute. In total, our cross section sample for year 2001 
includes 13,415 firms in 45 markets . Our sample period is from 1994 to 2001，while 
Egypt is available from 1996 to 2001 only. Table 1 shows the number of stocks in each 
country for different years. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
We admit that there are several imperfections in our dataset. First, too few stocks 
are covered for some countries, e.g., Belgium, Hungary, Ireland and Venezuela. For 
some other countries, even there is a substantial number of stocks, the coverage in terms 
of market capitalization may be still too small, e.g., Canada and South Korea. Second, 
due to resource restrictions, we do not try to access those suspended stocks {Datastream 
removes them from the stock lists). Finally, for simplicity in data compilation, we do not 
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trim our dataset for possible erroneous data. 
Table 2 reports the ranking of countries according to their stock return 
synchronicity measure，力，for two years (1995 and 1996). Panel B of Table 2 in MYY 
is also reproduced for comparison. Our sample largely preserves the main features of 
their sample. First, developed countries exhibit much lower synchronicity than 
2° Datastream code: LS&P15XX. 
21 MYY's sample contains 15,920 firms spaiming 40 countries for 1995. 
22 MYY trim their data by dropping biweekly observations for which the stock's return exceeds 0.25 in 
absolute value in order to avoid extreme observation due to coding error. Moreover, MYY exclude stocks 
for which less than 30 weeks of data is available for the year. 
23 See Chapter 2 for details. 
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developing countries do. Second, small stock markets in the developed world, e.g. 
Denmark and Ireland, exhibit fewer comovements when compared with their 
counterparts in emerging markets with similar size, e.g. Malaysia and China. Last, Japan, 
Spain and Italy are exceptional cases. They show a level of equity return synchronicity 
that is similar to that of low-income economies despite their high income levels�^. Our 
US sample exhibits a much higher synchronicity than that of MYY's sample does. It is 
probably due to our choice of stock list. The stock list of S&P1500 contains stocks of 
large US corporations, which often are the constituent stocks of some indexes. As we 
saw in the literature review, studies point out that stocks of an index often move together. 
[Insert table 2 here] 
The information of the number of weeks of up-markets and those of down-markets 
are used in the first part of the analysis. We report this information in Table 3 for 
reference. 
Insert table 3 here: 
In the second part of analysis, the information on market returns is required. Our 
market returns are the arithmetic weekly returns of the local index of each country. The 
local index we use is Associated Local Market Price Index provided by Datastream, 
which is the benchmark local price index for a given equity. Each stock is associated 
with one particular local market price index. Usually most of the stocks traded in one 
local market share the same local market index; occasionally some stocks traded in one 
24 MYY assert that it is due to poor outside shareholders' property rights protection although those 
countries provide good general property rights protection. 
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local market belong to price indexes of some other markets . Except for China, only 
two or three stocks are associated with foreign indexes for a particular country stock list; 
26 
therefore, we think it is appropriate to use the dominant index as the unique local index 
for a market. In our China stock list, there are twenty-eight companies in 2001. Nineteen 
of them are associated with SHANGHAI SE A SHARE, four with SHENZHEN SE A 
SHARE, and five with FTSE ALL. The high fraction of stocks not associated with the 
27 same index may introduce noise to our result . 
Indexes of 39 countries are available for the whole sample period and 5 of them are 
，R 
available for substantial periods . Colombia is taken out from our sample due to the 
small number of observations; so 44 countries are left in our second test. 
3.3 Asymmetric pattern of comovements 
The histograms of Itf are first examined. The frequency of Itfm the up markets and 
in the down markets for Denmark and Hong Kong are plotted and shown in 
figure 2. In the Denmark case, there is no obvious difference in the location of the peak 
of the distributions oi l t f^ and 胃， 
but it dose in the case of Hong Kong. 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
25 From our observations, we guess these companies are mainly controlled by foreign capital. 
26 The list of names of local index for each country is reported in Appendix Table 2. The Datastream 's 
definition of Associated Local Market index and other two variables used are shown in Appendix Table 3. 
27 The noise introduced should be small, however, as China exercises capital control within the whole 
sample period, and the Shanghai market and Shenzhen market are highly correlated. Moreover, ignoring 
the result of China does not seriously undermine our conclusions. 
28 Local index is available after July 6，2001 for Colombia; January 3; 1997 for Denmark; January 5，1995 
for Egypt; January 5，1996 for Norway; April 22, 1994 for Poland; and June 30，1995 for South Africa. 
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Table 4 reports the results. There are 358 yearly tests in total. If we take 10% as the 
significance level, there are 74 yearly tests that give us significant results; therefore 284 
test statistics favor the null hypothesis. Among the 74 with significant results, 69 
indicate that the expected synchronicity in down markets is larger than in the up markets. 
This result suggests that there is a weak tendency that stock prices comove more in 
down markets than in up markets (called as the asymmetry). 
[Insert table 4 here] 
If we consider the tests using the time series pooled data of eight years, there are 45 
tests in total. Out of them, there are 22 significant results and all of them show the 
asymmetry (Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Germany, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand the UK). In these 45 tests, no one shows 
that the expected synchronicity is significantly higher in up-markets than that in down-
markets. Those economies that provide significant results include both developed 
markets and emerging markets with radically different cultures. 
It may be worth considering the results ignoring the statistical significance (in this 
case we consider each year as an individual observation)^^. When we examine the 
29 In fact, there are some deficiencies in the measure Itf’ and the deficiencies may affect the 
meaningfulness of test statistics. Viewing that our definition of up-markets and down-markets is based on 
the numbers of rising stocks and falling stocks, the measure is sensitive to the coverage of the sample; 
coverage can greatly influence whether a market is up or down and affect the accuracy of the measure. 
The induced noise of coverage biases our estimation. Next, when fjt is near 0.5, there is larger chance to 
misleadingly recognize a week as up-market while it is down-market actually. For example, a market 
consists of 102 stocks, but we just consider 101 stocks in our sample. If 51 stocks in our sample rise in a 
week while 50 of them are falling, we will treat that week as up-market. However, if the stock which we 
do not consider is falling, the week should be recognized as neither up-market nor down-market. If 52 
stocks in the hypothetical market are rising, we are safe to claim that that week is up-market. In brief, the 
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results ignoring their statistical significance (consider only the sign of the difference), 
we see that the asymmetry persists in most countries around the world. Column (10) 
shows that in 28 out of 45 markets the expected synchronicity in down markets is larger • 
than that in up markets for at least 6 years. When we focus on East Asian countries, 
Hong Kong and Singapore show the fraction asymmetry in the whole sample period; 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand show the asymmetry in 7 years; and 
Japan, Korea and Malaysia show this asymmetry in 6 years. 
We substitute 广test by Wilcoxon rank-sum test to repeat the hypothesis testing as a 
robustness test^^. The results generally confirm our results of f tests above. 
3.4 Asymmetry During Extreme Market Movement 
Recall eq. 7, 
Itfi 二 a + + bjextreme 一 value^ + b^up^ * extrem _ value^ , 
where upi is a dummy variable which equals 1 (0) if the market moves up (down); 
extreme一value equals 1 (0) if the absolute value of the weekly market return is in the 
90仇 percentile (otherwise). 
We estimate the above model for the 44 economies in our sample using all data in 
the sample period. The results are reported in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5] 
accuracy of Itf in reflecting the information contained in stock prices is systematically associated to its 
value. 
Specifically, we test whether the median of广 and the median of/讓 are equal assuming that rank 
distributions of广 possess the same shape. One advantage of Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that it 
relies less on the normality assumption. The results are reported in Appendix Table 4. 
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There are twenty-seven economies showing a significant (10% level) negative 
effect of up-market on stock price synchronicity. If we consider the sign only, the 
coefficients on up are negative for all economies except Austria. It confirms the results 
of 广test in the previous section that the expected synchronicity will be lower in up 
markets than in down markets. After controlling for other factors in this section, the 
effects of up and down markets on the market synchronicity become significant for 
Brazil, Egypt, Hungary and Venezuela, while the effects are no longer significant for 
Israel and Norway. 
Except for Venezuela, b] is highly significantly positive for all economies. The 
exception may be due to the sample problem. As expected, extreme market movement is 
positively associated with the comovement measure. These results are trivial because 
market indexes attempt to reflect the general movement of a market 
Our focus is on the interaction of the up and down market and the extreme market 
movement. There are fifteen economies for which bs is significantly negative (10% 
level). The coefficients are significantly negative at 1% level for Austria, France, and 
Switzerland. Those of Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Philippines and the UK are 
significantly negative at 5%. Lastly, those of Argentina, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Thailand and the United States are significantly negative at 10%. Except for Venezuela 
where the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly positive at 5%, others are 
providing insignificant coefficients. Again, the countries that the interaction is 
significant come from different income levels and cultural backgrounds. 
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Combining the previous results, given that (1) except Austria for which bj is 
insignificantly positive, all 67's are negative and (2) b: is significantly positive for all 
countries except Venezuela, we interpret a significantly negative bs as indicating that for 
those countries stocks comove more in down markets during extreme market movement, 
i.e., the stock markets commove more when the market is falling dramatically. In sum, 
for a large portion of economies around the world, the stock markets commove more 
when the market is falling dramatically. 
3.5 The Relationship between Asymmetry and the Short-selling Restrictions 
A common conjecture by market regulators is that short-selling restrictions can reduce 
the relative severity of market panic. BGZ test this conjecture by examining the 
skewness of market returns. They find that in markets where short selling is either 
prohibited or not practiced, returns display significantly less negative skewness, and the 
frequency of extreme negative returns is lower. 
The effect of short sales may not only affect the skewness of equity returns, but 
also the asymmetric pattern of stock price comovements. When a market goes into panic, 
all investors rush to sell out their stockholdings. Speculators may exploit both over-
priced and even fair-priced (innocent) stocks by conducting short selling in these cases. 
And as short-selling restrictions can alleviate the severity of the panic, the stock price 
comovements in extreme downward market movement is expected to be less in the 
markets with short sales restrictions than those without. 
34 
To test this conjecture, we try to see whether the short-selling restriction is related 
to the significance of the coefficient of the interaction term in the previous section. Here, 
we interpret a significant hs as a sign of possible severe market panics. This test is at 
best a tentative study and its results are conditioned on our dataset. Using the results in 
the above stage, we try to find the association between short sales restriction and 
prominent asymmetry of comovements during extreme downward market movements. 
Our main tools are contingency table and logit regression. 
3.5.1 Data of Short Sales Restrictions 
Table 1 of BGZ contains information on short selling restrictions for 47 countries. "In 
35 of them, short selling is currently allowed, at least as of December 2001，the final 
date of [their] sample period. In 12 of these 47’ short-sales were prohibited for the entire 
sample period of January, 1990 to December, 2001. In 12 of the 35 countries where 
short-sales are currently allowed, restrictions existed in 1990 but were lifted at some 
point within the sample period...In three cases - Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Thailand — 
restrictions on short selling were removed and later re-enacted gradually.. .There is 
clearly a difference between what the law allows and what is common practice. 
Although short selling is currently legal in most countries, it is only practiced in 28. In 
some countries, tax rules make shorting very difficult.，，(BGZ) 
We employ their judgments on whether short selling is practiced in a country in our 
analysis. There are 41 countries in the intersection of our original data and theirs. 
35 
3.5.2 Results and Interpretations 
The relationship between short sales restriction and severe market panics (the 
significance of bs in the previous section) is shown by the following 2x2 contingency 
table 
Whether bs is significant 
at 10% level 
No Yes 
Short selling is not practiced 2 18 
Short selling is practiced! lo| ^ Phi coefficient = 0.4679 
26 15 41 /7-value of Fisher's exact test= 0.004 
In our sample, there are eighteen economies where short sales are not practised. In 
sixteen of them, bs is not significant at 10% level By contrast, more than half markets 
where short selling is practiced show a sign of severe market panics (bs is significant at 
10% level). 
In the Fisher's exact test, the null hypothesis is that countries where short selling is 
practiced and those where short selling is not practiced have equal chances of being 
vulnerable to severe market panic (bs is significant). As the p-value of Fisher's exact test 
is 0.004, we can reject the null hypothesis. This evidence supports the common 
conjecture that short-sales restrictions mitigate the severity of market crashes. 
If we assume that the short-sales restriction is exogenous, and assume that the 
variables satisfy the assumptions of a logit model, we can examine the association by 
running a cross-sectional logit regression. 
The result is 
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L = 一 2.079+ 2.342 short sales practice (8) 
‘ (-2.77) (2.72) 一 一 
X^ =9.80,N = 41. ‘ 
z-statistics in parentheses 
and the odds ratio of short一sales ^ practice equals 10.4. 
where the dependent variable U is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the estimated hs 
in the previous section is significant at 10% (being severe in market panic), and equals 0 
otherwise. The explanatory variable, short一sales jpractice, equals 1 if short selling is 
practiced in a market, and equals 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on the short—sales_practice is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Predicted odds that a market with short sales practice or without favors salient 
asymmetry are about 10.4 to 1. Again, more markets with short selling practice have a 
significant bs. These preliminary results suggest that there may be some kind of 
association between short selling restrictions and salient fractional asymmetry of 
comovements during extreme downward market movements. 
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Chapter 4 Corporate Governance and Stock Prices Comovements 
Recent research highlights the role of investor rights protection in shaping capital 
markets.^^ One of them is MYY's study. They demonstrate that investor rights 
protection greatly influences the informational efficiency of stock markets across 
countries. Their country-specific measures of investor rights protection significantly 
explain the cross-country variation in stock price comovements around the world. 
If investor rights protection is a significant factor in the determination of stock 
price comovements, then corporate governance, investor rights protection at firm level, 
should also explain cross-firm differences in comovements within a market. We employ 
the data of listed corporations from thirteen Western European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK) and nine East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) to detect the 
possible relationship between comovements and corporate governance. 
Some findings in MYY are reviewed here since our study extends from theirs. One 
main idea of their paper is that stock prices comove less in countries with better investor 
rights protection. It is because good institutional integrity promotes risk arbitrage and 
induces more informed asset pricing. Institutional integrity, in their view, consists of two 
elements: (1) general property rights protection by the state and (2) general protection 
for investor rights. 
31 See La Porta et al. (1997,1998，1999，2000). 
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To facilitate their analysis, MYY create proxies for the two elements of 
institutional integrity. "Good government index" is a proxy for the general property 
rights protection. This variable is constructed by summing up three indexes complied by 
La Porta et al. (1998), reflecting three aspects of a country: (1) the level of government 
corruption, (2) the risk of the government expropriating private property and (3) the risk 
of the government repudiating contracts. Low values of each index indicate less respect 
for private property. The other one is "anti-director rights index", which is a proxy for 
the shareholder rights against corporate insiders. This variable comes from La Porta et al. 
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(1998) again. High scores imply more legal rights for shareholders (MYY). 
In their regression analysis, both indexes are significantly negative associated with 
the stock market synchronicity. In a deeper investigation, in the plot of synchronicity 
against good government index^^, they find a cluster of strong property rights countries 
with low price comovements and a more diffuse cluster of weak property rights 
countries with high market comovements, but no significant relationship within each 
cluster. To explain this result, MYY put forth a threshold effect. It basically states that 
changes in the strength of general protection of property rights will have almost no 
effect on synchronicity if the level of protection is below or above a threshold level 
(good government index with value of 25). 
Furthermore, they show that the improvement in shareholder rights protection will 
reduce stock price comovements only in countries with general property rights 
protection above the threshold level. This result suggests that shareholder rights 
32 Descriptions of the indexes are reported in Appendix Table 5. 
33 Reproduced in Appendix Figure 1. 
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protection is enforceable only in countries with a substantial general property rights 
protection. 
4.1 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Transparency 
"Somewhat more generally we can define corporate governance as the set of methods to 
ensure that investors (suppliers of finance, shareholders, or creditors) get a return on 
their money."^"^(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The issue of corporate governance arises 
since the separation of ownership from control in modem corporations^^. Managers with 
shareholding less than 100% do not fully benefit from their corporate decisions. In the 
presence of asymmetric information between agents and costly monitoring, managers 
have incentive not to act in shareholders' best interests but pursue their own agendas 
instead. They could engage in shirking, inefficient investments, collecting private 
benefits from empire building and perk consumption, etc. 
This agency problem could exist between controlling and minority shareholders too. 
When the degree of ownership concentration is high enough for the controlling 
shareholders to have effective control of the firm, the controlling shareholders are able 
and tempted to act in their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders and 
creditors. 
34 Some argue that focusing on shareholder value only may be too narrow. They suggest that institution 
design should take into account the interests of natural stakeholders, e.g. suppliers, customers, and the 
community. This argument can be found in Tirole (2001). Claessens and Fan (2002), Shliefer & Vishny 
(1997)，Tirole (2001)，Vives (2000) and Zhuang et al. (2000) provide excellent surveys on corporate 
governance. This section is largely based on their works. 
35 Some argue that corporate governance does not matter if there exist complete contracts or prefect 
competitive product markets, see Shliefer and Vishny (1997). 
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Ownership Structure is a key component in shaping corporate governance. It 
determines the nature of agency problem; whether conflict between managers and 
shareholders or between controlling and minority shareholders is the dominant conflict. 
In dispersed ownership structure, a small shareholder would have no incentive in 
monitoring corporate management since he or she bears all the monitoring cost, but only 
shares a small proportion of the benefit. Dispersed shareholders tend to free ride on 
other shareholders. If each dispersed shareholder tries to free ride on other shareholders, 
managers receive almost no monitoring. Concentrated ownership can prevent managers 
from expropriation because large shareholders have sufficient incentive and voting 
power to monitor the managers. 
As mentioned, concentrated ownership, however, could give rise to an agency 
problem too. As it is difficult for dispersed shareholders to form consensus, controlling 
shareholders can effectively control the corporation and do for their own sake regardless 
of the interests of minority shareholders. Large shareholders can, for example, benefit 
from committing the company into disadvantageous business relationships with other 
companies they control. Anecdotal evidence and studies document examples how large 
shareholders expropriate minority shareholders during the Asian Financial Crisis . 
In economies where investor rights protection is weak, divergence between control 
rights and cash flow rights of the large shareholder can further deteriorate the corporate 
governance of companies. By manifold means, large shareholders can increase their 
voting power on a company without increase their investment proportionally. The large 
36 See Mitton (2000), and Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003). 
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shareholders have enough vote and power to influence corporate decision-making but 
receive relatively small cash flow. It is likely that their private benefit gain from the 
corporate decision that deviates from maximizing the firm value is much larger than the 
income loss due to the relatively small stakes they hold. Large shareholders have larger 
incentive to expropriate minority shareholders if the divergence of cash flow rights and 
control rights is larger. 
Transparency of corporations is also a key element of good corporate governance. 
Expropriation is harder to discover in a country with poor disclosure systems. Managers 
or controlling shareholders can use falsified accounting reports to cover their 
expropriations. Mitton (2002) mentioned that "Another example comes from Korea 
where minority shareholders of Samsung Electronics protested that the firm had been 
providing debt guarantees to less-successful Samsung group companies and that these 
guarantees often were not disclosed (The Economist 3/27/99, p.68)，，Furthermore, in 
Mitton's study, diversified firms in East Asia (low transparency due to complex 
structure), on average, had a lower return over the Asian Financial Crisis. This evidence 
supports the view that the reduced transparency of diversified firms offers greater 
opportunities for expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Misleading the markets itself could be a way of expropriation too. Managers could 
capture cheap funds from seasoned equity offering or make money from option trading 
and insider trading through using fault accounting information to boost the stock price. 
4.2 Firm-Level Synchronicity Measure 
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To facilitate our analysis, we introduce a firm-level comovements measure considering 
how frequent a stock moves in the same direction with the majority of stocks in the 
market. Specifically, the firm-level synchronicity measure is defined as the fraction of 
weeks in a year in which the price of an individual stock follows the movement of the 
majority in the market. 
To avoid ambiguity and non-trading bias, we drop weeks in which the number of 
stocks rising equals that falling. Similarly, we exclude stocks with zero weekly return in 
the calculation of our measure. 
In our notation, we drop a week t if and drop a stock if r.^ =0 in week t, 
where w j (《滅)is the number of stocks in country j whose prices rise (fall) in week t, 
and is the return of stock i in country j in week L Number of weeks counted in the 
measures for stock i is denoted by N^. 
For each week t and each stock i, we denote su 二 Iwhen the price of the stock 
comoves with the market, and Su = 0 otherwise. That is, 
一 1 if w j > (<) n， a n d � > ( < ) 0 
Sit A (9) 
� 0 otherwise, 
Then, we calculate the number of weeks when the price of stock moves with the 
majority in the market. For each year, the measure of Firm-Level Synchronicity of 
company i is given by 
y FLS, = ^ ^ e[0,l] (10) 
N i 
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Following MYY, we take logistic transformation of FLS to facilitate statistical 
analysis below, and denote the new variable as Isf. 
/ 功 I (11) 
4.3 Data Construction 
Price data for constructing FLS come from Datastream Company Account Services. 
Accounting data partly come from Faccio and Lang (FL, 2002) and Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang. (CDL, 2002), and complemented by the data of Datastream. Ownership data 
come from FL and CDL. FL and CDL collected the 1996^^ data on ownership structure 
for corporations in the nine East Asian economies and the thirteen Western European 
countries respectively. 
Both studies use the methodology developed in La Porta et al. (1999) to investigate 
ultimate control patterns in publicly traded corporations. They trace the control chain 
and identify ultimate shareholders. This practice largely makes clear the ownership 
structure of corporations. They document the ultimate controlling owners and how they 
achieve control rights in excess of their ownership rights through deviations from the 
one-share-one-vote rule, pyramiding, and cross-holdings. Their main data source is 
Worlds cope, supplemented by other sources that provide information on ownership 
structures as of December 1996 or the end of fiscal 1996^ .^ The complete sample of FL 
contains 5232 publicly listed corporations in thirteen Western European countries, and 
37 Precisely, 1996 is December 1996 or the end of the 1996 accounting year in their definition. 38 Their summaries of data source are reproduced in Appendix Table 6. 
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the complete sample of CDL contains 5,284 publicly listed corporations in the nine East 
Asian economies. Since price data and ownership data come from two data sets, we 
match the data set of price data with ownership data through matching the full names of 
company of the two datasets. 
4.4 Data Characteristics 
As mentioned in Section 4.3，our sample is constructed by matching ownership data 
with synchronicity data from two sources. After the matching, our basic sample�； of 
Western Europe contains 1255 corporations and our basic sample of East Asia contains 
1599 corporations. To describe the characteristics of our sample, the average Firm-
Level Synchronicity (FLS) by types of owner and by economies in Western Europe and 
East Asia are reported in Table 7 and 8 respectively. 
FL traced the ownership chain and identified the ultimate shareholders. (If there is 
no shareholder holds voting rights exceeding a threshold/cutoff level, e.g. 20%, we say 
the corporation is wildly held at that cutoff level. Otherwise, the corporation is said to 
have an ultimate owner. This point will be further discussed in the next section). The 
types of owner are grouped into six categories: 1) Family: A family (including an 
individual) or a firm that is unlisted on any stock exchange^^. 2) Widely held financial 
institution: A financial firm (SIC 6000-6999) that is widely held at the control threshold. 
39 (i) The observations of our basic sample contain basic accounting information, and information of 
synchronicity and basic ownership structure, (ii) The number of observations in regression analysis below 
varies with specifications. 
40 The type of family owner may to a little extent deviate from its literal meanings. When CDL failed to 
identify the owners of an unlisted firm, then they classified them as a family. 
45 
3) State: A national government (domestic or foreign), local authority (county, 
municipality, etc.), or government agency. 4) Widely held corporation: A non-financial 
firm, widely held at the control threshold. 5) Cross-holdings: Firm Y is controlled by 
another firm, which in turn controlled by Y, or directly controls at least 20% of its own 
stocks. 6) Miscellaneous: Charities, voting trusts, employees, cooperatives, or minority 
foreign investors. (FL) 
Table 7 reports the average Firm-Level Synchronicity for different types of largest 
shareholders at 20% cutoff level in the Western European economies. If we compare 
Table 7 with its counterpart in FL (Table 3), they find that widely held and family 
controlled are the most important categories in all western European countries; 36.93% 
of corporations are widely held and 44.29% of corporations have family controlling 
shareholders. In ours, the figures are 33.55% and 50.52% respectively. The percentage 
of firms with Widely held financial corporations as controlling owner drops from 9.03 to 
5.58. Our sample basically preserves the pattern of controlling shareholders in Western 
Europe FL described: (1) widely held firms comprise a large portion of UK firms, and 
widely held firms are also relatively common in Scandinavia, but substantially fewer in 
other continental European countries; and (2) family controlled firms are the majority in 
most continental European countries. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
For individual countries, the distortion of data compilation is serious in the cases of 
Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The percentage of widely held firms drops from 
20.00 to 6.67 in the Belgium data, while the percentage of widely held firms rises from 
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26.42 to 52.00 in the Spanish data. For both Ireland and Portugal, the figure for the state 
as controlling owner is around 4% in Faccio and Lang (2002), but none of these state-
owned firms are included in our sample"^\ 
Either the figures of all country whole sample or those of individual countries show 
that the average synchronicity is high for widely held corporations and corporations with 
controlling shareholders as widely-held financial corporations. It has been found that in 
Western Europe and East Asia large firms in an economy are more often widely held. 
(CDL or Faccio and Lang (2002)) It is suspected that widely held corporations are 
usually large and diversified corporations. They are expected to have higher 
synchronicity42(It will be discussed in the next sections in detail). 
Table 8 reports similar information for East Asian economies, but the cutoff level 
for the controlling shareholders is only available for 5%. The distinction in the cutoff 
levels makes it difficult to compare our sample with the sample of CDL. Table 2 of CDL 
shows the percentage of firms controlled by different controlling owners at the 10%, 
20% and 40% thresholds. We compare ours to their information using the 10% threshold. 
Due to the distinction in threshold level, our data identify fewer firms as widely held 
(the term Dispersed ownership is used in Table 8 in order to follow the use of terms in 
CDL). In their data, 41.9% of Japanese firms are widely held and the figure is 14.3 for 
Korea. Besides this, our sample largely preserves the characteristics of the data source. 
This may be the result of data loss during compilation. This may be also reflecting the wave of 
privatization in Western Europe in recent years. 
42 Other possibilities cannot be ruled out. One of them is that our measure, FLS, captures the effect of 
firm-specific risk. And the ownership structure of widely held companies is particularly suitable for firms 
with low firm-specific risk (This point will be discussed in detail in Section 4.6.1). 
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Most of the firms are family owned in East Asia. State-owned firms comprise a 
substantial portion of firms in Malaysia and Singapore. And firms with widely held 
financial corporations as controlling owners comprise a substantial portion of firms in 
Japan. Since the reduction of widely held firms in our sample is trivial when the cutoff 
level is lower, we think our sample preserves the pattern of controlling shareholders in 
East Asia. 
[Insert table 8 here: 
In our sample, only Japan contains widely held firms in the 5% cutoff level. Not 
much can be inferred on the effect of the identity of the largest shareholder on 
synchronicity. However, both the figures of all country whole sample and those of 
individual countries show that the average synchronicity is high for corporations with 
controlling shareholders as widely-held financial corporations. 
4.5 Regression Framework and Variable Descriptions 
To assess the impact of corporate governance variables on firm-level synchronicity, we 
regress the logistic transformed Firm-Level synchronicity measure, Isf on variables 
related to corporate governance (ownership structure) and control variables of firm 
characteristics. That is, the following linear model"^ ^ is estimated: 
Isf •产 a + b^ (Corporate Governance Variables)+(Size)+ b^ (Leverage) + 
+ 64 (Other control variables) + e, (12) 
This model is analogous to that of Mitton (2002). 
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in which the corporate governance variables and the control variables vary with 
specifications. 
This study focuses on the effect of corporate governance on the stock price 
comovements. We think that corporate governance and stock price comovements are 
mainly linked by the disclosure quality. Outside investors (including arbitrageurs) are 
easier to evaluate the intrinsic value of a stock if the stock provides more accurate 
information relevant to its own value to the market. Therefore, stocks with good 
disclosure quality comove less with the market. Besides, stocks with better disclosure 
quality gain the confidence of investors, and thus more capable of resisting the impact of 
market-wide rumors. For both reasons, high disclosure quality could reduce the firm-
level synchronicity of a stock. 
As we saw in Section 4.1, transparency is an important element of corporate 
governance. In economies without proper investor rights protections, corporate insiders 
(managers or controlling shareholders) solely decide the disclosure policy of a 
corporation. Corporate insiders could choose disclosure policy that hides their 
expropriation. Furthermore, low transparency of diversified firms also offers 
opportunities for insiders to expropriate outside investors. Our prediction is that a 
corporation with ownership structure that facilitates expropriation is more likely to have 
poor disclosure quality; in turn, its stock price comoves more with the market. In this 
thesis, we consider two aspects of ownership structure: ownership concentration and the 
separation of cash flow rights and control rights of the largest shareholder. A higher 
ownership concentration and lower degree of the separation of cash flow rights and 
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control rights can improve corporate governance, and thus reduce firm-level 
synchronicity. 
In the subsequent paragraphs, we describe the explanatory variables used in our 
regression analysis. We first discuss the variables used in the analysis of Western 
Europe in detail and then those of East Asia. Basically, the definitions of explanatory 
variables in the analysis of Western European firms and those of East Asian firms 
follow FL and CDL respectively. Variables, their definitions and their expected effect 
on firm-level synchronicity are reported in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Cash flow rights and Control rights 
In this thesis, corporate ownership means the cash flow rights while control rights mean 
voting rights. For example, if a family owns 25% of Firm X that owns 20% of Firm Y, 
then this family owns 5% of the cash-flow rights of Firm Y (the product of the 
ownership stakes along the chain) and controls 20% of Firm Y (the weakest link along 
the control chain). Ownership and control rights can differ because corporations can 
issue different classes of shares that provide different voting rights for given cash-flow 
rights. The two rights can also differ because of pyramiding and holding through 
multiple control chains. (FL). 
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Control threshold, wieldy held corporation, and ultimate owner 
The difficulty of coordinating the decisions of dispersed shareholders suggests that if the 
largest shareholder holds a substantial block of shares, then that shareholder has 
effective control. In line with recent studies, we assume that 5% of the voting share 
suffices to have a certain degree of control. In other words, we use a cutoff level at 5% 
at any intermediate levels of ownership as well as the ultimate level. If no shareholder 
exceeds a given control threshold, then the firm is identified as widely held at that 
threshold (FL). If a shareholder controls a corporation via a control chain whose links all 
exceed that threshold, he is said to be an ultimate owner at a given threshold. "If a firm 
has two owners with 12% of control rights each, then [FL] say that the firm is half 
controlled by each owner at the 10% threshold, but that the firm is widely held at the 
20% threshold." (FL). 
Ownership concentration 
In our study, the variable Ownership concentration (or Ownership conc.) measures the 
concentration of ownership of the largest shareholder. We use 5 percent as the cutoff 
point (the largest shareholder holds at least 5% control right at each level of control 
chain) in our empirical analysis, and the 10% cutoff point will also be used sometimes. 
As mentioned in Section 4.1，concentrated ownership alleviates the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders. From this point of view, high ownership 
concentration improves corporate governance and should have a negative impact on the 
stock price comovements. 
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Cash flow rights to control rights (Cash/control right) 
We use the ratio of cash flow rights to control rights (denoted as Cash/control right) to 
measure the degree of separation of cash flow rights and control rights'^. As mentioned 
in Section 4.1, separation of the two rights can exacerbate the entrenchment problems, 
which the controlling owner may opportunistically deprive minority shareholders' rights. 
From the corporate governance point of view, high degree of divergence of the two 
rights of the largest shareholder (low value of Cash/control right) improve corporate 
governance and should have a positive impact on the stock price comovements. 
However, some theories suggest another possible relationship between the 
separation of rights and information disclosure. In order to maintain the controlling 
power in an affiliated group, a large portion of personal wealth of controlling 
shareholders is invested in the corporate equity of a single group. To optimize the risk 
exposure, block shareholders have incentive to diversify their personal wealth through 
diversifying the investment portfolio of the corporation. One way to do it is to hold 
shares of other companies in other industries. In this case, controlling shareholders can 
exercise their relatively high voting rights to force management to disclose more 
corporate information. This risk-reduction argument does not specify the direction of the 
effect of Cash/control right on disclosure policy, as well as, stock price comovements. 
We use this measure by following Claessens et al. (2002), FL, and Mitton (2002). 
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Management 
We also include the variable "Management" in our analysis. FL define that a member of 
the controlling family is in management if he or she is the CEO, Honorary Chairman, 
Chairman, or Vice-Chairman. If the controlling shareholder is part of the management, 
the minority shareholders basically have no effective means to monitor the managers. 
Large shareholders could be more likely to for their own sake ignore the interests of the 
minority shareholders'^^. From the corporate governance point of view, a member of the 
controlling family in management deteriorates corporate governance and should have a 
positive impact on stock price comovements. 
Shareholder alone 
We also include the variable "Shareholder alone" in our analysis. A controlling 
shareholder is said to be "alone" if no other owner controls at least 10% of the voting 
rights (10% cutoff level). On the one hand, when there are several independent and large 
shareholders, they may monitor each other and reduce the chances of expropriation. On 
the other hand, when several related and relatively large shareholders are present, they 
may form coalition to obtain control of the corporation and expropriate outsiders 
(minority shareholders and creditors). From the corporate governance point of view, the 
This problem is suggested to be serious in Western European and East Asian corporation, since studies 
like FL and CDL find that family-controlled firms is the dominant ownership structure form in these 
regions. The controlling family often assigns family members to key management positions in their 
family-controlled conglomerates. In such a structure, managers are almost not worried about being 
displaced. Proxy contests and hostile takeovers are inactive under this structure. 
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effect of Shareholder alone on the comovements is unclear; it depends on the 
relationship between the large shareholders. 
Dual class share, Pyramiding (Pyramid), and Cross-holdings 
Controlling shareholders can enhance corporate control through issuing shares with 
different rights. Firm Y is said to have dual class share structure (denoted as Dual class 
share) if it has outstanding non-voting, limited voting or multiple voting shares. 
Firm Y is said to be controlled through pyramiding (denoted as Pyramid) if it has 
an ultimate owner, who controls Y indirectly through another corporation that it does 
not wholly control. For example, if a family owns 15% of Firm X，that owns 20% of 
Firm Y, then Y is controlled through a pyramid at the 10% threshold. However, at the 
20% threshold, we would say that Firm X (which is widely held at 20% threshold) 
directly controls Firm Y and no pyramid exists. (FL) 
Firm Y is said to be controlled by a cross-holding at the 10% (or 20%) threshold if 
Firm X holds a stake in Firm Y of at least 10% (or 20%), and Y holds a stake in Firm X 
of at least 10% (or 20%), or if firm Y holds directly at least 10% (or 20%) of its own 
stocks. (FL) 
Dual class share structure, pyramiding, and cross holding are various instruments to 
enhance corporate control. Blockholders can use them to increase the control right 
without increasing their investment proportionally. The prediction of the effects of these 
control-enhancing devices is similar to that of Cash/control right. From the corporate 
governance point of view, employing these devices enlarges the divergence of the two 
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rights of the largest shareholder and worsens corporate governance. It thus should have a 
negative impact on stock price comovements. On the other hand, the risk-reduction 
argument described above does not specify the direction of the effect of Cash/control 
right on disclosure policy as well as stock price comovements. 
As mentioned, FL and CDL share the same methodology in the construction of 
ownership data. Their data are basically complementary to each other. The definitions of 
ownership structure variables (Ownership concentration, Cash flow/control right, Cross-
holding, Management, Dual class share and Pyramid) are also the same in the two data 
sets. 
Diversification 
The dataset of CDL (the sample of East Asia) allows us to test other potential factors. 
The first one is Diversification. Diversification is defined as the number of industry 
segments (two-digit SIC code recorded in Worldscope) that account for at least 10% of 
sales revenue of a firm. "Corporate diversification is not a corporate governance 
mechanism [in nature]. However, previous studies have suggested that agency problems 
are different within diversified firms. Diversified firms in emerging markets are usually 
associated with low transparency, which results in a high level of asymmetric 
information that may allow managers or controlling shareholders to be more easily to 
take advantage of minority shareholders... [0]ne way in which diversified firms could 
dissipate value during the crisis is by inefficiently supporting diversified industries with 
resources from relatively stable industries." (Mitton, 2002) Considering Mitton's 
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argument, we anticipate that the diversification is positively related to our synchronicity 
measurement. Moreover, "large firms generally have more divisions and often operate in 
more than a single industry and market." (Roll, 1988) Returns of large firms to certain 
extent mimic the return of diversified portfolio. Either argument points out that 
Diversification should be positively correlated to synchronicity. 
Family Group 
Another related variable is the dummy variable of Family Group. CDL identify several 
family group affiliations in East Asia. In their definition, a corporation is "group-
affiliated" if it meets one of the following criteria: (i) it is controlled by shareholders via 
pyramiding, i.e., indirectly through another corporation in the sample; (ii) it controls 
another corporation in the sample; (iii) it has the same controlling shareholder as at least 
one other corporation in the sample; (iv) its controlling shareholder is a corporation or 
financial institution that is "widely-held" in that no shareholder holds 10% or more of 
the control rights. (CDL) 
The effect of family group affiliation is expected to be similar to that of 
diversification. Intergroup financial transfer that is not market based can be a means for 
managers to expropriate minority shareholders. To cover up expropriation, corporations 
in the family affiliation may be less willing to disclose information. From the corporate 
governance point of view, the controlling family has incentive and ability to expropriate 
minority shareholders; therefore, corporations in a family group are more likely to 
comove with the market. 
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However, if resource transfer is used as a means to rescue affiliated firms as last 
resort, the stock will be less likely experiencing financial distress in bad times. Their 
stock prices may have higher resistance to adverse macroeconomic shocks, and thus, 
show lower synchronicity. 
We can also control for the industry factor in the East Asian case by the 
introduction of Industry dummies in our regression analysis. Corporations are classified 
into 14 industries'^^. We can also control for the owner type factor (types of owner are 
described in section 4.4) in the East Asian. We create a dummy for each type of owner. 
Including ownership dummies may make it more difficult for us to detect the effect of 
corporate governance, as the literature suggests that the identity of the owner will 
determine the behavior of managers. For example, when a significant owner of a non-
financial corporation is a bank, the corporation may become soft in granting loans. 
Year of Establishment 
We can also control for the age of the corporation (High score for younger firms). 
Usually, older companies have better governance, as it is justified by their survival. 
Claeseens et al. (2002) also assert that older firms are usually more willing to disclose 
information. We expect this variable to have positive effects on our synchronicity 
measure. 
46 Petroleum (SIC 13, 29), Consumer durables (SIC 25, 30，36，37，50, 55，57)，Basic industiy (SIC 10，12， 
14’ 24, 26，28, 33), Food and tobacco (SIC 1, 2，9，20，21，54), Construction (SIC 15’ 16，17, 32, 52), 
Capital goods (SIC 34，35, 38), Transportation (SIC 40，41’ 42, 44，45’ 47), Unregulated utilities (SIC 46， 
48)，Textiles and trade (SIC 22，23, 31’ 51，53, 56, 59), Services (SIC 72, 73，75, 76’ 80，82’ 87，89), 
Leisure (SIC 27, 58，70，78，19), Financial corporations (SIC 6000-6999)，Regulated utilities (SIC 4900-
4999), Miscellaneous (SIC not included in the above categories). 
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Leverage and Firm size 
Two variables controlling characteristics of a firm are used in both studies. They are 
leverage and firm size. Capital structure determines the sensitivity of a stock in 
responding to interest-rate-related macroeconomic shocks. In particular, high leveraged 
corporations should have higher interest rate sensitivity, hence, be more sensitive to 
macroeconomic shocks as most macroeconomic shocks affect or are related to interest 
rates (or credit). It is expected that high debt ratio leads to high synchronicity. However, 
"by including leverage or a control variable, [We are] potentially making it more 
difficult to detect the effects of weak governance. Specifically, weak corporate 
governance could have been correlated with higher debt levels . ""(Mitton, 2002) 
Studies suggest that debt can either improve or deteriorate corporate governance of a 
firm. We relegate the discussion of the relationship between leverage and synchronicity 
to the later sections. 
Firm size is also an important determinant of comovement behavior. Conventional 
view holds that larger firms are often highly diversified; hence, its price mimics the 
price of a diversified portfolio. As Firm size is another proxy for the diversification 
factor, a positive relationship between it and the dependent variable is expected. 
The conventional view is challenged by Roll's (1988) study. Using the US data, 
Roll does find that CAPM adjusted R is significantly correlated with the natural 
logarithm of firm size. However, the correlation is not so clear in the case of 5-factor 
APT i?2. With additional evidence that a significant improvement in the P? for small 
firms by using multi-factor model, Roll suggests that the higher explanatory power of 
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market models for large firms is due less to general diversification. Furthermore, as 
mentioned in the literature review, many argue that stocks in index, which usually 
consist of large firms in a market, on average commove more. For the above reasons, 
Firm size is expected to be positively correlated with firm-specific synchronicity, 
However, large firms may be a sign of good management and governance. 
Claessens et al. (2002) argue that large firms are usually willing to disclose more 
information than small ones. In addition, financial analysts often pay more attention to 
the high liquidity large firms and discover more news about these large firms. For the 
above reasons, firm size can be negatively correlated with firm-level synchronicity. 
From Roll's (1988) empirical results, we tend to expect a positive relation between 
firm size and firm-level synchronicity. In this study, we use the natural logarithm of 
firm's total asset as a measure of firm size. 
4.6 Regression Results and Interpretations 
The objective of this chapter is to detect potential relations between corporate 
governance and synchronicity at the firm level. We predict that poor governance 
practices can lead to a high Firm-Level Synchronicity. It can be caused by, (1) insiders 
choose poor disclosure policy to cover their acts of expropriation; (2) the high 
unpredictability of future cash flow of corporations with poor corporate governance; (3) 
investors lack confidence in corporations with poor corporate governance and follow 
rumors when trading such stocks. From the variable description above, we can test two 
hypotheses. (1) Ownership concentration is predicted to be negatively associated with 
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firm-level synchronicity since concentrated ownership mitigates the conflict between 
shareholders and managers, and (2) the firm-level synchronicity is expected to be higher 
if a member of the controlling family is in management. 
In this section, we first discuss our regression results using the sample of Western 
Europe followed by that of East Asia. At the end, we try to consider the two sets of 
results together. 
4.6.1 Results Using the Sample of Western Europe 
The results for Western Europe present a quite consistent pattern in the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm-level synchronicity. Table 9 reports the 
regression results employing the overall sample of Western Europe. The first thing noted 
is the low adjusted R^ for several specifications, all of which are lower than 0.2. It 
indicates that the predictive power of our model is low. 
[Insert table 9 here] 
Our major objective is to detect the effect of ownership structure on the 
comovement behavior. For the seven specifications including Ownership concentration, 
a clear negative association between ownership concentration and the firm-level 
synchronicity is shown. In column (1), when Cash/control right is not included, the 
negative effect of ownership concentration is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient 
becomes significant at the 5% level after adding the Cash/control right (See column (3)). 
The coefficient of Cash/control right is positive for all specifications tested. The 
significance of the effect of separation of cash flow rights and control rights varies with 
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specifications. The estimated coefficient on Cash/control right is significant at the 10% 
level in specifications (3) and (5). In specification (6)，the coefficient becomes 
significant at the 5% level after the removal of financial firms. In column (5), we use the 
control right minus cash flow right as an alternative proxy for the separation of 
ownership and control.斗？ The coefficient on Control right minus Cash flow right is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. In short, the change in the proxy does not affect 
the significance. It is likely that, in markets with good property right protection, 
pyramiding is a pure means for corporations to conduct diversification. 
For control variables, Firm size is significantly positively correlated with 
synchronicity in all specifications. Leverage is significantly negatively associated with 
the dependent variable for specifications (1) - (6)�I t is clear that leverage decreases with 
firm-level synchronicity. From corporate governance point of view, debt restricts the 
managers in expropriating the free cash flow, and thus enhances the corporate 
governance. Moreover, in countries with good creditor protection, managers tend to 
reduce their misbehavior to prevent private benefit losses in case of financial distress. 
Some may be concerned with the dominance of UK data in our sample. For 
example there are 424 observations of UK in the total 1255 observations in the 
estimation of specification (4). Column (6) shows that the sign of coefficients does not 
47 Control right minus cash flow right is another commonly used proxy for the separation of the control 
right and cash right, (e.g. Claessens et al.，2002) This variable considers the absolute divergence of cash 
flow right and relative divergence at the same time, while Cash/control right only considers the relative 
divergence. For example, the largest shareholder of a company holds 4% cash flow right and 20% control 
right, then Cash/control right is 0.2 while Control right minus cash flow right is 16%. In another company, 
if the largest shareholder of holds 15% cash flow right and 75% control right, Cash/control right is 0.2 
also but Control right minus cash flow right is 60%. 
61 
change after the removal of UK data"^ .^ Several papers such as Clasessens et al (2002) 
and Mitton (2002) dropped the financial firms in order to reduce the possible bias due to 
the differences between financial firms and non-financial firms, e.g. leverage level. In 
specification (6)，financial firms are discarded; the result changes only slightly. No 
evidence shows that stocks price comovements are different between financial and non-
financial firms. 
To examine the relationship between variables in each individual country, we 
basically repeat specification (4) in Table 9 for each economy. The results by economy 
are reported in Table 10. The results of Belgium, Ireland and Portugal are merely 
meaningless as their samples are too small. Belgium and Italy's results are suspected to 
be subject to the multcolinearity problem. Since the correlation between the two 
variables, Ownership conc. and Cash flow/control right, is as high as 0.93 and 0.8lin 
Belgium and Italy respectively"^^. The ^statistics for the coefficients are suspected to be 
unreliable. 
[Insert table 10 here] 
The first finding is that R^s of the regression vary a lot. The R^ of Germany is as 
low as 0.03 (272 observations) while some are relatively high, e.g. the R of Spain is 
0.27 (50 observations) and that of Italy is 0.48 (47 observations). This evidence gives us 
48 We also try to remove other countries one by one; the results do not change greatly by doing so. The 
results are reported in Appendix Table 7. 
49 The results of Italy sample could be acceptable, since the Variance Inflation Factor are 4.18 and 3.84 for 
Ownership conc. and Cash/control right respectively, which are within practical acceptable region (See 
Chatteijee, Hadi and Price, 2000). 
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an impression that ownership structure has more explanatory power for the stock prices 
comovements in Southern European countries, but not the Northern ones. 
The coefficient on ownership concentration for Norway is significant at the 1% 
level and that of Austria and Switzerland are significantly negative at the 5% level. 
These results confirm the results using pooled data. However, the coefficients on 
ownership concentration are not significant in other countries. To see whether data of 
these countries drive our results for the overall Western Europe, we estimate column (4) 
using all Western European economies except for Austria, Norway and Switzerland, the 
results of which are displayed in column (7) in Table 9. The coefficient on ownership 
concentration is significant at the 10% level. Therefore, we accept that it is a common 
phenomenon in Western Europe that ownership concentration is negatively associated 
with synchronicity, though the strength varies from economy to economy. 
Norway and Austria, again, show a significant association (at the 10% level) 
between Cash/control right and our dependent variable; Switzerland also shows a 
relatively significant correlation between the two variables (the j9-value of the 
coefficient is 10.3%). This result suggests that there is some kind of similarity in these 
three countries. For other countries, the coefficients on Cash/control right are 
insignificant. 
The coefficients on firm size are highly significant for seven Western European 
economies. Small sample size can explain the insignificance of the coefficient for 
Belgium and Ireland. Clearly, Firm size is positively correlated with synchronicity in 
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Western Europe. The other control variable, leverage, is not significantly related to firm-
specific synchronicity for most countries except for Spain. 
To detect the relationship between firm-specific synchronicity and other 
governance variables, we regress the dependent variable on other corporate governance 
variables. The results are reported in Table 11. The coefficients on Cross-holding, 
Shareholder alone, Management and Dual class share do not exhibit any significant 
effect on the firm-level synchronicity. Only the coefficient on Dual class share is 
marginally significant, with ^statistics of -1.64, when the ownership conc. and the 
Cash/control right are not added (see column (1)). In short, we cannot find significant 
relation between synchronicity and the exercising the devices of enhancing corporate 
control by large shareholders. 
Insert table 11 here] 
6.4.2 Results Using the Sample of East Asia 
The establishment of European Union and Euro Area can be evidence showing the high 
similarity among Western European countries. They are similar in the culture, business 
environment, economic policy and income level. We believe that it is appropriate to 
discuss those thirteen countries as a whole unit economically^^. However, East Asian 
economies are less homogenous in the economic development, income level, legal 
institutions, government structure, religions, geography, etc. Drawing inferences from 
50 “...The [European] Comminity has issued several directives designed to unify European commercial 
laws, including some of the laws that pertain to corporate governance. Several countries have changed 
their laws to adhere to EC directives. ” (La Porta, et al., 1998). 
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the pooled sample of all the nine economies could be misleading. We are here 
considering three sets of subsamples from East Asia: (1) all the nine counties as a whole, 
(2) all economies excluding Japan, and (3) the economies of Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand^ ^  
Table 12 presents the regression results employing all data of East Asia. The first 
six columns are results using the sample with all the nine countries, the next four 
columns using the sample excluding Japan, and the last four columns using the sample 
of the economies Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
[Insert table 12here] 
The explanatory power of the model is low as R^s are also generally low. We 
expect there is a relationship between ownership structure and comovements. However, 
neither ownership concentration nor the separation of cash flow rights and control rights 
exhibits significant effect on the firm-level synchronicity among all specifications tested. 
Although in columns (2), (3) and (5) the coefficient on Cash/control right is significant 
at the 10% level, the coefficient is no longer significant after the removal of Japan from 
the sample (comparing columns (3) & (7)) or after the introduction of owner type 
dummies52 (comparing columns (4) & (6)). 
51 Faccio, Lang and Yeung (2002) consider all the nine countries in our sample as a whole. Claessens et al. 
(2002) consider the nine countries excluding Japan as a whole. One of the reasons they explained is that 
most firms in Japan have dispersed ownership structures, and ownership and management are separated 
far more often than in other East Asian economies. Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand are generally regarded as countries that were most involved in the East Asian financial crisis, e.g. 
see Mitton (2002). It is likely that they share some kinds of similarity in their economic structure. 
52 Besides owner type dummies, we have tried adding industries dummies, but the joint significance of 
industries dummies are low. Roll (1988) found abnormal behavior of R^  for petroleum and utility 
industries. We have also tried to remove them and the results only change slightly. See Appendix Table 8. 
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When the relatively developed East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Japan, 
Singapore and Taiwan) are present in the sample, the coefficient on Firm size is 
significantly positive. After the removal of those countries, the coefficient on Firm size 
becomes in significant (See columns (11)-(14)). Comparing columns (3) and (5) or 
columns (7) and (10)，the significance of the coefficient on firm size is reduced after the 
introduction of Diversification variable. This result confirms the conventional view that 
large firms move more together with the market as they are often more diversified. In all 
specifications, the coefficient on Leverage is significantly positive at the 1% level. 
We also check our results by repeating specification (4) in Table 12 for each 
economy (country dummies are dropped) . The results are reported in Table 13. We 
suspect that the regressions suffer from influential cases. To address this problem, we set 
aside data that move one or more coefficients on ownership conc.，Cash/control right, 
Leverage or Firm size by half a standard error (that is, have absolute DFBETAS greater 
than 0.5).54 The result is shown in Panel B of Table 13. After this treatment, the 
coefficient on Leverage for Hong Kong becomes significantly negative, the coefficient 
on Firm size for Indonesia becomes significantly positive, and the coefficient on Firm 
size for the Philippines becomes significant at the 10% level. 
[Insert table 13 here] 
We include owner type dummies，as they are jointly significant (See Table 13). We do not include 
industries dummies in the regression, as they are not jointly significant (not reported here). 
54 (i) Details of DFBATE can be found in Hamilton (1992，1998). (ii) The routine removal of suspected 
outliners is arguable. Statisticians argue that outliers and influential cases should not routinely be deleted 
or automatically down-weighted because they are not necessarily bad observations. (See Chatteijee, Hadi 
& Price，2000) 
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Except for Hong Kong and Thailand, the ownership structure related variables do 
not have a significant effect on the synchronicity in East Asian economies. For Hong 
Kong and Thailand, the largest blockholder ownership (Ownership conc.) is 
significantly positively correlated with the synchronicity measure. And the Cash/control 
variable is negatively correlated with the synchronicity measure (the coefficient for 
Thailand is only marginally significant). 
For Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, the effect of leverage on synchronicity is 
positively significant at the 5% level. There is a significant association between leverage 
and synchronicity. One explanation is that East Asian firms rely heavily on loans, 
especially short-term loans^^; hence, changes in short-term interest rates or interest-rate-
related macroeconomic variables have great impact on most of the stocks. 
To study the effects of other governance variables in East Asia, we regress the 
synchronicity on several corporate governance related variables. The results are reported 
in Table 14. Panel A uses the sample excluding Japan, and Panel B uses the sample 
including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
[Insert table 14 here] 
In panel A, the coefficients on Year of establishment, Family group, Management, 
Pyramid and Diversification are insignificant. In panel B, the coefficient on Year of 
establishment is significant in several specifications. However, this result is driven by 
the Philippines data. Excluding the Philippines data largely reduce the significance (see 
column (2)). 
“See Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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4.6.1 Econometric Issues 
A number of econometric issues in the regression analysis need to be addressed. Besides 
heteroskedasticity, we find no patterns remain in the residual plots. Hence, omitted 
variable bias raises less concern. With no grounds in assuming any deterministic pattern 
of the variation of the residuals, we choose to report the heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors rather than to seek alternatives to OLS estimation to address the 
heteroskedasticity problem. 
The problem of measurement errors is almost unavoidable in the empirical study of 
corporate governance. Agency cost is a main issue in corporate governance, but it is 
almost impossible to measure agency cost directly. In our study, we follow the literature 
using Ownership concentration and Cash/control right as proxies for agency costs. The 
proxies are not perfect as many factors can affect the agent costs, e.g. the presence of 
several large shareholders^^, industry, and corporate hierarchy^^, etc. 
Another issue is potential endogeneity of the predictors in the model. In fact, the 
reverse causality, that is, the firm-level stock prices variation determines the ownership 
�Q 
Structure, has been extensively examined by the literature . In their seminal work, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the structure of corporate ownership varies 
56 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have used the Herfindahl index of the percentage share of the important 
shareholders as a measure of ownership concentration. 
57 See Bushman, Chen and Engel (2003). 
58 In the discussion about the relationship between corporate governance and stock prices comovement at 
country level, Chen (2002) provides a possible way of reverse causality. In an opaque stock market, it is 
rational for managers or controlling shareholders to expropriate shareholders and potential shareholders 
since the market is unable to distinguish them. The capital markets provide them opportunity to 
expropriate without costs. Opaque markets corrupt good firm. 
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systematically in ways that are consistent with value maximization. They have also 
identified factors that influence the structure of corporate ownership. They include (1) 
value-maximizing size of a firm, (2) control potential, (3) systematic regulation and (4) 
amenity potential of firms. Control potential and amenity potential of firms are 
particularly relevant to our study. 
Control potential is the wealth gain a firm's owner can achieve by imposing a more 
effective monitoring of managerial performance. Firm-specific uncertainty determines 
the benefit of control potential. Owners are easier to monitor the performance of 
managers in corporations doing business in a stable environment such as stable prices, 
technology and market shares. Operating in less stable environments, the cost of 
monitoring managerial performance may be high as it is difficult to distinguish whether 
the outcomes of projects are due to the environmental factors or the efforts of managers. 
This theory is supported by empirical evidence. In their regression analysis with a 
sample including 511 large U.S. corporations, they found that firm-specific risk is 
significantly related to ownership concentration^^ in a way that the higher the firm 
specific risk, the higher the ownership concentration. The significantly negative relation 
between our synchronicity measure and Ownership concentration in the sample of 
Western Europe may indicate that a higher ownership concentration is optimal in firms 
with higher firm-specific risk. 
59 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use three measures of instability examined here are (1) firm-specific risk, as 
measured by the standard error of estimate calculated from fitting the "market model,"(2) the standard 
deviation of monthly stock markets rates of return, and (3) the standard deviation of annual accounting 
profit rates. All three measures are significantly related to ownership concentration. 
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The cross-sectional nature of our ownership data makes us unable to tackle this 
problem completely. Nevertheless, the use of FLS as a measure of firm-level 
synchronicity should reduce the concerns about endogeniety. FLS counts how frequently 
a stock moves with the market; this measure aims at revealing the fraction of price 
movement of a stock caused by the arrival of unanticipated firm-specific news. The 
magnitude of the variations in firm value seems to be more relevant to the consideration 
of ownership structure. 
Using Western European and East Asian data also alleviates this problem since 
corporate ownership in these regions is less driven by the efficiency criterion. Under 
keen competitions, market force may drive the firm to act efficiently and may push them 
to achieve an optimal ownership structure. This may be not the case in the two 
considering regions. Economic, industrial and labor policies of Western Europe are 
generally regarded as rigid, which reduces the competitiveness of product markets. In 
less developed East Asia, economies are not fully open and their big corporations retain 
substantial market power. Therefore, the business environments of these two regions 
allow the corporate ownership of giant corporations to deviate from the optimal 
ownership structure under keen competition. 
Demnsetz and Lehn have introduced the concept of amenity potential that is the 
non-pecuniary private benefit of control. Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (BPS, 2002) 
summarize three broad views of the benefit to a family of preserving control. First, a 
founder is delighted in having his children run the company that bears the family name. 
The second one is that the name itself may be a carrier of reputation, in both economic 
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and political markets. Families may stand for quality or for political connections. The 
third reason is the possibility of expropriation of outside investors that come with 
control (BPS). These views suggest that the ownership choice can be largely based on 
the preference of corporate founders and the political economy of a country. 
In Western Europe and East Asia, the vast majority of publicly traded firms are 
family controlled. ^ ^ In Western Europe, children of a founder either hire a manager, as 
in BMW or Fiat, or operate the firm themselves, as in Peugeot. In emerging markets, 
such as East Asian countries, both management and ownership tend to stay with the 
family when the founder steps down. Sometimes, a manager marries into the family, as 
the case of Matshushita in Japan and Worldwide Shipping in Hong Kong (BPS). It 
shows that ownership structure is partly determined exogenously in Western Europe and 
East Asia. 
We also address this issue in two ways. They give us mixed results. First, we 
control the firm-specific risk and growth opportunity in the regression. The logarithm of 
the standard deviations of weekly return of a stock in 1994 and 1995 is used to control 
firm-specific risk and the market-to-book ratio is used to control the growth opportunity. 
The results are displayed in Table 15. Controlling the two additional factors basically 
does not affect our findings about the effect of ownership structure. 
[Insert table 15 here] 
Second, we also check our results with an instrumental variable approach. This 
approach assumes that past values of the ownership structure variables (in year 1996) 
60 Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2002) provide a list of studies regarding this issue, including Claessens 
et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). 
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are uncorrelated with the error terms in regressions using synchronicity in 2000, the 
dependent variable. Investment decisions in the past probably affect the synchronicity in 
the future but not the other way round. The results are reported in Table 16. The 
explanatory power of ownership structure is largely reduced. Significant coefficients 
appear only in Portugal, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. There are many possible reasons for 
the poor results using instrumental approach, e.g. change in accounting practices, we 
tend to conclude that ownership structure does affect stock price comovements to a 
certain extent after considering all evidence although the results of instrumental variable 
approach is not aligned with our results in the previous section. 
[Insert table 16 here] 
4.6.2 Analysis of the Combined Results 
Since (1) a number of coefficients related to ownership structure are not significant in 
the regressions, (2) some of the results for East Asia do not confirm the findings in the 
Western European sample and (3) the significant correlation between ownership 
concentration and stock price comovements in the sample of Western Europe can be 
explained by the reverse causality, it seems that the possibility that there is no 
relationship between ownership structure and the synchronicity cannot be ruled out 
when we consider the two sets of results together. 
In this section, we provide another interpretation to the combined results of 
Western Europe and East Asia with insights from two recent studies: MYY and Faccio, 
Lang and Young (FLY, 2002). 
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, MYY proposed, and supported by 
statistical evidence, a threshold effect. The threshold effect describes that changes in the 
strength of shareholder right protection of a country will have an effect on synchronicity 
only if the general property right protection is above a certain threshold. General 
property rights are on average well protected in the European countries. The good 
government indexes^^ for Western European countries are very close to or above the 
threshold, 25. Even the lowest one, the good government index for Italy is 24.65. 
However, for East Asia, the good government index for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand are all below 25. For the Philippines, the index is as low as 
12.94. In the poor property right protection markets, the informed arbitrageurs are few. 
The improvement of corporate governance of a particular corporation cannot induce 
much firm-specific variation. Then the relationship between corporate governance and 
synchronicity will be weak. By contrast, in markets with good property rights protection, 
there are a substantial number of professional investors in the market. A corporation 
with good governance practice as well as disclosure policy can attract the attention of 
investors; hence, improvement in corporate governance can induce much more firm-
specific variation. Then the relationship between corporate governance and 
synchronicity will be strong. Therefore, there is no surprise for the inconsistent results 
61 Good Government Index: Austria (27.86), Belgium (27.93), Finland (28.82), France (27.89), Germany 
(28.6), Ireland (27.15)，Italy (24.65), Norway (25.59), Portugal (24.85), Spain (25.3)，Sweden (28.98)， 
Switzerland (29.96), UK (28.44), Hong Kong (25.63), Indonesia (15.4), Japan (27.78), Korea (22,2)， 
Malaysia (22.76), Philippines (12.94), Taiwan (25.63), and Thailand (20.17). The indexes are calculated 
from data reported in La Porta et al. (1998). 
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on the significance of the effect of ownership structure on synchronicity in the two sets 
of results62. 
We then revisit our result that the effect of leverage on synchronicity is different in 
the two samples. In our overall sample of Western Europe, leverage and firm-level 
synchronicity is negatively significantly correlated. In some specifications, the 
coefficient on Leverage is significant at the 1% level. In the regression using the sample 
of an individual economy, the coefficient on Leverage for ten out of thirteen economies 
is negative although the significance is low in general. By contrast, in our results using 
the sample of East Asia, leverage and firm-specific synchronicity is significantly 
positively associated. For all the fourteen specifications in Table 12, this relationship is 
significant at the 1% level. For individual economy samples, this relationship is 
significant at the 5% or 1% level in the cases of Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
In the earlier discussion, we interpreted this result as a reflection of high reliance of East 
Asian firms on short-term loans. Because of this reliance, changes in short-term interest 
rates or interest-rate-related macroeconomic variables have great impact on most of the 
62 This argument may also be applicable to Hong Kong and Singapore although the good government 
index is 25.63 for Hong Kong and 26.88 for Singapore respectively. The strength of property rights 
protection for investors in these two markets is not so clear. When we look at chart 3 in Dumev et al. 
(2003)(reported in Appendix Figure 1), the points for Hong Kong and Singapore lie at the boundaries of 
clusters. TTie openness of these two markets reduces the meaningfulness of good government index in 
reflecting the general property right protection received by the investors. Substantial portion of companies 
in these two markets is operating out of their territories. Hong Kong corporations relocated their plants to 
Mainland China since the start of open door policy in China in the late 1970，s. Other industries follow 
their manufacturing counterparts in the following decades to extend their markets in China. Moreover, 
Chinese companies began being listed in Hong Kong from the early 1990's. Corporations with strong 
links to China dominate the Hong Kong Stock Exchange now. Similar to Hong Kong, Singapore is also a 
small open city with almost no natural resources and heavily relies on her hinterland: Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Singapore became the business center serving neighboring countries well before its 
independence. In both cases, considering the property right protection level in their own jurisdictions is 
insufficient because their corporations are deeply influenced by the institutional strength of other countries. 
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stocks at the same time. FLY provide us with insights on an alternative explanation for 
the results about the effect of Leverage on synchronicity. 
The role of debt in corporate governance depends on how governance is exercise. 
How governance is exercised depends on the structure of corporate ownership and 
control as well as investor protection from the state^^. Debt can constrain managerial 
expropriation, as debt commits the firm to pay out cash and reduces the amount of 
corporate cash flow available to the managers to deprive. Moreover, the loss in 
reputation of the managers when the corporation defaults on its debt also imposes a 
constraint. However, within a corporate pyramid, the increase in indebtedness by 
affiliates need not constrain expropriation by the controlling shareholder because the 
affiliates can be rolled over by group banks or transfers from other affiliates. By contrast, 
higher leverage facilitates expropriation by increasing the recourses under the control of 
controlling shareholders. (FLY) 
FLY further argue that the role of debt in corporate governance depends on the 
institutions of the financial markets. In a market that ensures high transparency and 
substantial protection for creditors and minority shareholders, suppliers of finance know 
the structure of corporations and are aware of the possible expropriation. Through the 
competition in capital markets, informed investors require the firms that are vulnerable 
to expropriation to become more leveraged as a commitment. In contrast, in a capital 
market with ineffective institutions where transparency is low and the rights of creditor 
63 The relationship between debt and corporate governance in East Asia may be more complex than that 
presented here, e.g. Leuz, Oberholzer-Gee (2003) consider the relation among the political connections, 
the transparency, and capital structure of East Asain corporation. 
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and minority shareholder are poorly protected, the corporate insiders 
(manager/controlling shareholder) dominates corporate leverage decisions so that an 
affiliate that is more vulnerable to managerial expropriation would be less levered. 
Extending their rationale, our combined results can be alternatively interpreted in 
the following way. The market institutions in Western Europe are widely recognized as 
effective, where investors are well informed. Under keen competition in capital markets, 
corporations need to persuade outsiders that they are good firms in some ways. 
Disclosure of more corporate information and high leverage are two substitutable ways. 
For corporations using new technology, the most value-relevant information is their 
technological development, which is not allowed to be disclosed (predicted to have high 
synchronicity). In such a case, they may be willing to be highly leveraged and to be 
monitored by creditors. For corporations in mature industries, the exposure to interest 
rate risk may be a high priority in their capital structure consideration. They are more 
willing to disclose information rather than being highly leveraged. We would expect a 
negative relation between stock price synchronicity and leverage. Another possibility is 
that, firms with low synchronicity typically have high disclosure quality and may find it 
easier to issue debt. We would also expect a negative relationship between leverage and 
synchronicity. 
Relation-based corporate structures^"^ are prevailing in East Asia such as family-
based affiliates in the less developed East Asia, Keiretsu groups with a "main-bank" in 
Japan, and Chaebols groups that are closely related to the government in Korea. They 
^ Some ideas in this section come from Raj an & Zingales (1998). They provide an excellent sketch of 
relation-based system as well as Arm's length system. 
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facilitate inter-firm transactions, such as related lending. On the one hand, related 
lending within corporate groups can support affiliates that have long-term prospects but 
are seemingly poor investments in the short-run. Such farsighted investment strategy is 
believed to have contributed to the rapid growth of East Asia in the past decades. On the 
other hand, related lending may facilitate expropriations such as tunneling and propping. 
Leverage in such corporate systems could also be a tool for expropriation. It is likely 
that those corporations with poor disclosure quality (with high synchronicity in our 
interpretation) in East Asian countries would highly leveraged^^. 
Therefore, there is no surprise for us to find a negative relation between 
synchronicity and leverage in Western European countries, while finding a positive 
relation between the two variables in East Asian economies. 
65 Moreover, in East Asia before Asian Financial Crisis financial, institutions are probably more willing to 
finance firms with strong political connections (Usually low transparency). (See Rajan & Zingales (1998) 
and Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee (2003)) 
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Chapter 5 Concluding Remarks 
We can see many changes in the views in financial economics on stock price 
comovements. In the early days, in line with the prevailing efficient market hypothesis, 
many believe that comovements in the arrival of news about intrinsic firm values largely 
explain the comovements in stock prices. However, this view is challenged by more and 
more empirical research amid the increasing skepticism about the efficient market 
hypothesis. Strong evidence supports that the trading habit and sentiment of investors, and 
the activities of institutional investors are causes of stock price comovements too. 
The view on the interaction of real economy and financial markets is also widening 
by the rapid development of research in economic institutions. Morck, Yeung and Yu 
(2000) find that the institutional development, namely the property rights protection and 
shareholder rights protection, can significantly explain the cross-country variation in stock 
price comovements. Stimulated by the study of Morck, Yeung and Yu, subsequent studies 
point out the importance of short sales regulation and freedom of press in the market 
efficiency as well as the development of financial markets. 
Recent research reveals several asymmetric patterns in financial markets as well as 
investor behavior that we used to think them as symmetric. McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley 
(1996) find evidence suggesting that all stocks react quickly to negative macroeconomic 
news, but that some small stocks adjust to positive news about the economy with a delay. 
We speculate that this phenomenon could create asymmetry of stock price comovements 
in up and down markets. 
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In Chapter 3，we have attempted to test three things. First, using a sample of forty-
five economies around the world spanning eight years, we test whether on average stock 
prices commove more in down markets than in up markets, ^tests give us weak evidence 
that supports the existence of asymmetry. The results using yearly data are relatively 
mixed. However, the results using data of the whole sample period is quite encouraging; 
we find that in twenty-two out of forty-five economies the difference between average 
synchronicity in up and down markets is significant showing the existence of the 
asymmetry. Second, employing data of forty-four countries spanning eight years, we use 
regression models to test whether the asymmetry is more salient during extreme market 
movements. Fifteen countries give results that support our hypothesis. We conclude that 
stock prices commove more when the market is falling dramatically for a substantial 
portion of countries around the world. Third, we tentatively test a common conjecture that 
short-sales restrictions mitigate the severity of market crashes. The preliminary results 
support this hypothesis. 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) find that country-level difference in investor rights 
protection can explain the variation in comovements across countries. In chapter 4，we 
seek to see whether firm-level investor protection (corporate governance) can explain the 
variation in comovement behavior across stocks. First, we define firm-level synchronicity 
as number of weeks in a year that a stock moves with the market. Then, we regress this 
synchronicity measure on ownership structure and financial data of listed stocks in thirteen 
Western European and nine East Asian economies in 1996. We get the following findings 
from OLS estimations. 
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Firstly, our sample of Western Europe shows that the ownership share held by the 
largest shareholder is significantly negatively associated with firm-level synchronicity. 
Intensive monitoring from large shareholders could reduce the synchronicity of a 
corporation. It suggests that concentrated ownership enhances corporate governance 
forcing management to disclose more information. 
Secondly, our sample of East Asia does not show relations between ownership 
concentration and firm-level synchronicity as in Western Europe. On the one hand, it may 
challenge the robustness of our results of Western Europe. One the other hand, this result 
may be caused by the threshold effect described by Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). Investor 
protection could have an effect on the stock price comovements (proxy for corporate 
disclosure quality in our interpretation) only if the economies have substantial general 
property rights protection. Otherwise, these kind of protection is just words on paper. It is 
widely agreed that property rights protection in East Asia is not so satisfactory before the 
Asian Financial Crisis, while the situation in Western Europe is much better. Therefore, it 
is not surprising for us to obtain a strong relationship between ownership concentration 
and synchronicity in Western Europe but a weak relationship between the variables in East 
Asia. 
Finally, we find a seemingly contradictory result of the relationship between leverage 
and firm-level synchronicity. We find a negative association between the two variables in 
our sample of Western Europe, but a positive one in our sample of East Asia. This 
difference may reflect the difference in financial market institutions (e.g. transparency, 
accounting and tax system, regulations...) in these two regions. Faccio, Lang and Young 
80 
(2002) put forth that debt constrains expropriation in economies with effective market 
institutions, while debt facilitates expropriation in markets with ineffective market 
institutions. Out result is consistent with them: in Western Europe the capital markets 
require corporations with lower disclosure quality (reflected in higher firm-level 
synchronicity) to be highly leveraged as a substitute for information disclosure, while in 
East Asia the firms with low disclosure quality are less leveraged since debt can facilitate 
expropriation. 
Despite considerable progress, our knowledge of stock price comovements remains 
limited. For example, the rationale for asymmetry, and the rationale for the diverse pattern 
of the relationship between corporate governance and synchronicity studied in this thesis 
need more research in the future. 
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Table 1. Number of stocks in each country for different years 
Approximated coverage 
in terms of the 
percentage of market 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 capitalization* 
Argentina 35 37 38 40 41 42 42 42 30 
Australia 183 191 212 222 234 241 249 251 80 
Austria 59 65 66 69 71 74 75 76 75 
Belgium 30 30 32 33 34 35 37 37 75 
Brazil 91 98 107 112 124 124 124 124 25 
Canada 409 425 456 483 511 534 544 544 10 
Chile 76 76 79 84 84 84 84 84 31 
China 20 21 22 23 23 23 23 23 10 
Colombia 22 22 22 23 23 23 24 24 55 
Denmark 137 140 145 148 157 160 166 170 70 
Egypt N.A. N.A。 10 12 13 13 13 13 N.A. 
Finland 66 69 80 89 100 119 120 120 90 
France 237 251 279 303 356 363 368 371 85 
Germany 399 418 433 461 519 649 701 701 90 
Greece 118 125 127 128 134 137 141 141 41 
Hungary 21 24 26 28 30 35 35 35 25 
Hong Kong 428 449 483 548 577 607 686 753 100 
bidia 209 214 217 223 223 223 223 223 45 
Indonesia 179 198 209 235 241 249 269 299 33 
Ireland 29 29 29 30 31 33 33 33 71 
Israel 29 30 32 33 45 45 45 45 80 
Italy 68 76 81 89 99 111 130 140 70 
Japan 1513 1567 1608 1645 1671 1708 1769 1792 100 
Malaysia 458 510 600 685 713 734 772 791 100 
Mexico 53 53 59 63 63 63 63 63 31 
Netherlands 79 85 87 95 107 119 122 122 75 
New Zealand 67 71 74 83 85 90 100 110 100 
Norway 64 75 84 113 128 132 149 159 80 
Pakistan 62 64 67 72 72 72 72 72 58 
Peru 31 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 40 
Philippines 144 173 191 201 205 208 213 216 100 
Poland 16 19 29 37 51 54 54 57 30 
Portugal 40 43 44 46 47 48 48 48 67 
Singapore 179 195 209 240 260 299 367 395 100 
South Africa 220 230 255 287 344 383 392 400 100 
South Korea 513 539 581 605 608 621 622 624 22 
Spain 77 77 81 91 96 106 110 113 90 
Sweden 84 92 110 163 198 251 292 296 85 
Switzerland 141 148 154 165 179 187 190 191 95 
Taiwan 210 226 235 239 240 242 242 242 30 
Thailand 300 326 357 362 363 363 364 370 100 
Turkey 66 70 72 76 76 76 76 76 21 
U K 782 860 972 1065 1126 1188 1390 1490 98** 
US 1180 1235 1306 1355 1393 1437 1474 1494 N.A. 
Venezuela 11 12 12 12 12 14 14 14! 67 
Notes, (i) W e count a stock if price information of that stock appears in the last week of the year in our 
dataset. (ii) N.A. stands for "not available". 
* Approximate percentages of market capitalization covered by Datastream Company Accounts service 
provided in the help file of the Datastream terminal, which was recorded in 1998. **UK company account 
consists of two parts: UKFIN and UKQI. W e take a simple average on the claimed market capitalization of 
these two stock lists. 
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Table 2. Ranking of countries in terms of return synchronicity 
(1) (2) Q) 
% stocks % stocks % stocks 
Year: 1995 moving in Year: 1996 moving in Year: 1995 (MYY) moving in 
Country stepQ^ Country step ( f j ) Country step ⑥ 
Canada 57 Germany 55.2 United States 57.9 
Germany 53 5 Canada 57.7 Canada 58.3 
U.K. 593 France 59.3 France 59.2 
South Africa 59.4 U.K. 59.4 Germany 61.1 
United States 59 5 Indonesia 60.2 Portugal 61.2 
France 60 Switzerland 60.2 Australia 614 
Denmark 60 Denmark 60.4 U.K. 63.1 
Switzerland 60.5 South Africa 60.8 Denmark 63.1 
Australia 61 Austria 60.8 New Zealand 64.6 
New Zealand 61.6 Hong Kong 61.1 Brazil 64.7 
Indonesia 62.4 Norway 61.2 Netherlands 64.7 
Netherlands 62.5 Australia 61.3 Belgium 65 
Norway 63.3 Sweden 62 Ireland 65.7 
Portugal 63.7 Portugal 62.1 Pakistan 66.1 
Austria 63.8 United States 62.3 Sweden 66.1 
Sweden 64 Brazil 62.6 Austria 66.2 
Finland 64.2 Philippines 62.6 Italy 66.6 
Hong Kong 65 New Zealand 62.9 Norway 66.6 
Ireland 65.8 Netherlands 64.6 Japan 66.6 
Spain 65.8 Hungary 65 Chile 66.9 
Greece 66.2 Italy 65.4 Spain 67 
Thailand 67.3 Thailand 65.5 Indonesia 67.1 
Philippines 67.4 Spain 65.6 South Africa 67.2 
Brazil 68 Finland 65.8 Thailand 67.4 
Chile 68.2 Chile 66.7 Hong Kong 67.8 
Hungary 68.2 Ireland 66.8 Philippines 68.8 
Italy 68.3 Singapore 67.1 Finland 68.9 
Singapore 68.8 Greece 67.1 Czech 69.1 
Belgium 69.9 Taiwan 67.7 India 69.5 
Mexico 70.1 Peru 67.8 Singapore 69.7 
Venezuela 70.3 Belgium 68.4 Greece 69.1 
South Korea 70.4 Malaysia 68.7 Korea 70.3 
India 71.3 South Korea 68.9 Peru 70.5 
Pakistan 71.7 Mexico 59 Mexico 71.2 
Peru 74_7 India 79.9 Columbia 72.3 
Japan 75.1 Pakistan 71.2 Turkey 74.4 
Israel 75.2 Poland 71.3 Malaysia 75.4 
Malaysia 75.5 Columbia 7I.7 Taiwan 76.3 
Columbia 76.7 Turkey 71.9 China 80 
Argentina 77.2 Japan 74.4 Poland 82.9 
Turkey 78.9 Argentina 75 
Taiwan 79.8 Israel 76.3 
Poland 80.4 Venezuela 78.6 
China 82.4 China 80.3 
Egypt N.A. Egypt 9 0 
Notes, (i) Countries are ranked by stock return synchronicity, measured by the fraction of stocks moving 
together in the average week. Column (1) shows the ranking in 1995. Column (2) shows the ranking in 
1996. And Column (3) reproduces Panel B in table 2 of Morck, Yeung & Yu (2000). (ii) N.A. stands for 
"not available". 
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Table 3. Number of weeks considered in the analysis conditioning on the market circumstances (up or down markets) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Markets up down up down up down up down up down up down up down up down 
Argentina 24 28 24 24 26 24 29 22 23 23 25 26 20 31 16 34 
Australia 19 32 31 20 31 21 31 21 20 30 26 26 20 32 31 21 
Austria 22 30 21 27 30 20 32 18 28 24 29 24 30 20 31 20 
Belgium 25 23 29 23 32 20 30 21 30 20 22 29 21 29 24 28 
Brazil 39 12 19 32 25 25 26 26 21 31 35 17 22 30 25 27 
Canada 17 35 28 24 35 17 27 25 22 30 20 33 19 33 25 26 
Chile 28 23 24 27 18 34 23 28 18 34 31 21 18 32 29 23 
China 10 24 18 29 22 16 25 22 19 29 22 24 27 16 19 27 
Colombia 16 31 14 27 19 26 28 16 18 26 20 26 14 31 25 17 
Denmark 21 31 27 24 39 11 29 20 21 30 23 29 26 25 20 29 
Egypt N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 4 5 19 25 15 35 24 26 18 32 21 23 
Finland 20 31 20 30 36 13 32 19 21 29 27 25 18 32 25 27 
France 23 29 17 35 24 27 27 25 29 23 29 24 21 31 27 24 
Germany 24 28 24 28 18 34 30 22 28 24 21 32 12 40 22 29 
Greece 20 31 21 31 17 35 32 20 25 26 34 19 11 40 22 29 
Hungary 20 28 24 21 31 19 31 18 21 26 26 26 19 32 20 30 
Hong Kong 16 36 20 32 31 21 23 29 16 36 26 27 20 32 22 29 
India 22 29 16 35 18 34 23 29 23 29 27 26 22 30 22 30 
Indonesia 15 36 16 36 28 23 21 31 24 28 25 27 17 34 18 34 
Ireland 25 27 36 13 35 17 37 13 30 21 23 28 26 24 31 19 
Israel 23 23 26 21 26 24 27 22 25 27 32 21 29 20 25 26 
Italy 28 23 24 28 20 32 28 24 26 26 26 27 22 30 23 29 
Japan 25 27 22 30 21 31 18 34 20 32 25 28 23 29 22 30 
Malaysia 19 33 23 29 24 27 14 38 18 34 25 28 19 33 28 24 
Mexico 24 27 28 23 27 23 30 22 23 29 30 22 16 34 24 27 
Netherlands 24 26 30 21 35 17 33 19 25 27 25 26 19 32 26 26 
New Zealand 20 32 24 27 27 24 18 32 20 31 28 24 18 33 28 23 
Norway 23 27 29 21 37 14 30 20 19 32 26 26 21 31 23 28 
Pakistan 23 27 22 30 21 30 20 31 22 30 25 27 25 27 22 28 
Peru 25 23 23 26 22 29 27 25 18 32 23 28 12 38 20 28 
Philippines 24 28 19 32 29 23 16 36 23 29 27 26 14 38 14 38 
Poland 9 19 21 22 21 25 18 31 18 31 26 26 22 29 21 31 
Portugal 21 29 17 34 28 21 30 22 25 27 21 31 17 33 21 30 
Singapore 19 33 23 29 18 33 15 37 20 32 32 21 14 37 22 29 
South Africa 32 20 31 20 26 26 26 25 25 27 24 29 17 35 32 19 
South Korea 27 25 18 34 24 28 21 31 25 26 25 28 21 31 28 24 
Spain 24 27 25 27 32 19 31 21 27 25 20 33 16 35 28 22 
Sweden 24 27 21 30 34 18 28 24 25 27 30 23 20 32 24 27 
Switzerland 22 29 28 23 28 22 32 20 31 21 33 19 28 24 22 30 
Taiwan 28 23 22 29 28 24 26 25 21 31 22 30 20 32 23 28 
Thailand 18 34 19 33 17 35 16 36 22 30 25 28 19 33 32 20 
Turkey 24 27 22 29 29 21 32 19 23 26 33 16 21 28 29 21 
U K 20 32 28 24 24 28 21 31 22 30 30 23 16 36 24 27 
US 29 23 37 14 31 21 29 23 30 22 29 24 29 23 30 22 
Venezuela 23 20 22 25 28 17 20 20 14 22 20 27 19 27 15 32 .Note. N.A. stands for "not available". 
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Table 4. The sign of the difference of the expected synchronicity in up-markets and down-markets, Ejltf) - E(h/函) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number 
Pooling of years 
sample the 
using difference 
1994- is less 
Market 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 Data than zero 
Argentina + - - - - - - 7 
-0.4248 -0.1344 -0.8363 -0.3586 -0.2585 -0.567 (0.0492)* -0.3632 (0.0110)* 
Australia + - + + + - - 4 
-0.6391 [0.8029] -0.2289 -0.1182 -0.6225 -0.6214 -0.5673 -0.514 [0.9761] 
Austria - + + + + + - - - 3 
-0.9308 -0.8928 -0.492 -0.3779 -0.7734 -0.8116 -0.5821 -0.968 -0.9167 
Belgium - - + + - - - + - 5 
[0.2434] (0.0273)* -0.6344 -0.5269 -0.9647 -0.4038 -0.5729 -0.6261 [0.6352] 
Brazil + - - - - + - - - 6 
-0.1674 [0.0123]* -0.4213 -0.2306 -0.3806 -0.8412 -0.3937 -0.2309 -0.1789 
Canada - - - - - - - - - 8 
-0.4164 -0.4753 -0.1176 -0.1136 [0.1286] -0.4212 -0.7404 -0.608 (0.0023)* 
Chile - - - - - + - - 7 
-0.6508 -0.4063 (0.091)* [0.0040]* (0.0675)* [0.1972] -0.9198 -0.8806 (0.0063)* 
China + - + - • - + - - 5 
-0.9036 -0.8153 -0.9016 -0.6634 -0.2134 -0.1258 -0.4891 -0.4618 (0.0626)* 
Colombia + + + + + - - + 3 
(0.0642)* (0.6126)* [0.0229] -0.1362 -0.6211 -0.4725 -0.409 [0.7397] -0.5667 
Denmark + + + + - - + - + 3 
(0.0429)* -0.6704 -0.1857 -0.5742 (0.0086)* -0.8883 -0.7543 -0.6725 -0.6864 
Egypt N.A. N.A. + 5 
N.A. N.A. (0.0345)* -0.8151 -0.4127 -0.5112 -0.2611 -0.4136 -0.1509 
Finland + _ + - - - - + - 5 
-0.7458 -0.3732 -0.7231 -0.6785 -0.7024 -0.2979 (0.0565)* [0.477] -0.2828 
France + . . + . - - 6 
(0.0084)* -0.6445 [0.075]* -0.3018 -0.3213 -0.5891 -0.7394 (0.0322)* [0.1043] 
Germany - - - - - - - - - 8 
(0.0864)* (0.0066)* -0.4686 [0.9886] (0.0492)* (0.0066)* -0.2486 (0.0011)* (0.0000)* 
Greece - - - - + + + - - 5 
-0.3938 -0.4621 -0.4621 (0.0313)* -0.1944 -0.3188 -0.7927 -0.9303 -0.5119 
Hong Kong - - - - - - - - - 8 
(0.0001)* -0.4 -0.1832 (0.0163)* -0.4345 -0.6504 (0.0769)* -0.6054 [0.000]* 
Hungary _ - + + - - - - - 6 
(0.0795)* -0.2551 -0.1786 [0.7016] -0.6126 -0.795 -0.7039 -0.4131 -0.249 
India + . + . . . . . . 6 
-0.5286 -0.4477 -0.7729 [0.0521]* [0.8478] -0.2435 (0.0023)* (0.0910)* (0.0031)* 
Indonesia + . . - 7 
(0.0172)* -0.2493 (0.0566广（0.0602)* -0.06 -0.1191 (0.0069)* -0.2948 (0.0002)* 
Ireland - + + + - - - - - 5 
(0.0988)* -0.1661 -0.4332 -0.2025 -0.126 -0.8295 -0.4983 [0.2872] [0.5076] 
Israel - - - - + + - - - 6 
-0.3546 -0.543 (0.0262)* -0.3266 -0.5103 -0.2336 -0.1487 -0.4906 (0.0924)* 
Italy - - - + - - + - - 6 
-0.7321 -0.1316 -0.7907 [0.2802] [0.9585] -0.2919 [0.7746] (0.0491)* -0.2222 
Japan + - - _ + - - - - 6 
-0.8765 -0.6297 -0.3121 (0.0045)* -0.3877 -0.294 -0.1016 -0.5389 (0.0185)* 
Korea (Rep. of) - - - - + - - + _ 6 
-0.8518 -0.5548 -0.3828 -0.5108 -0.703 -0.5701 -0.4459 [0.32361 -0.3109 
• (Continued on next page) 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
(1) (2) ⑶ （4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Malaysia + - - - + - - - 6 
-0.52 [0.1941] [0.809] -0.5802 (0.0543)* -0.5295 -0.3821 -0.4627 -0.2254 
Mexico + - - + - - - - - 6 
[0.7731] -0.1385 -0.5394 [0.9076] (0.0039)* (0.0786)* (0.0541)* (0.0576)* [0.0007]* 
Netherlands + - + - - - - - - 6 
[0.6095] -0.1508 [0.2738] [0.3242] -0.1178 [0.0347] (0.0616)* (0.0177)* [0.0128]* 
New Zealand - + + - + - + - 4 
-0.3003 -0.8858 -0.3231 [0.1923] -0.5177 [0.0824]* -0.534 -0.7268 -0.2855 
Norway + - - + - - - 6 
-0.765 -0.3979 -0.5617 [0.8237] (0.0225)* -0.446 [0.3069] (0.0861)* [0.0357]* 
Pakistan + - 7 
[0.0230]* (0.0007)* -0.1022 -0.6213 (0.0147)* -0.026 -0.8262 -0.1141 (0.0006)* 
Peru - - - + + + - - - 5 
-0.6143 -0.3726 -0.7615 -0.7652 -0.9058 -0.2661 (0.0031)* -0.1949 -0.1626 
Philippines + - - - - - - - 7 
(0.0113)* -0.8301 (0.008)* (0.0000)* -0.2964 -0.2343 [0.0835]* -0.755 (0.0000)* 
Poland - - + - - + - - 6 
-0.4934 -0.243 (0.0045)* -0.7173 -0.6539 -0.3443 -0.2091 (0.0354)* -0.4673 
Portugal + - + - - - - - - 6 
-0.8753 (0.0069)* (0.015)* -0.6828 -0.123 -0.9019 -0.1802 (0.062)* (0.0806)* 
Singapore - - - - - - - - - 8 
-0.3818 -0.4299 -0.1209 [0.1503] -0.5622 -0.6947 -0.2651 [0.9681] (0.0625)* 
South Africa + + _ . _ + _ - - 5 
-0.1092 -0.6032 [0.113] [0.4019] (0.0324)* -0.6389 [0.8527] -0.5178 [0.2829] 
Spain - - - + + - - - 6 
(0.0534)* -0.5833 -0.3658 -0.9326 -0.9266 (0.0285)* -0.1789 -0.1579 (0.0423)* 
Sweden + + + - - - - - 5 
-0.9646 -0.3647 -0.4177 -0.1852 (0.0262)* (0.0948)* [0.0773]* (0.0662)* (0.0063)* 
Switzerland _ - - + - - - - - 7 
[0.3308] -0.313 -0.9251 [0.1406] -0.1146 -0.9469 -0.8846 -0.1372 [0.1548] 
Taiwan + - - - - " - 7 
-0.2532 [0.1848] -0.4758 -0.9841 -0.528 [0.2125] -0.1051 [0.3242] (0.0127)* 
Thailand + - 7 
[0.0048]* [0.2226] (0.0106)* (0.0000)* -0.6606 -0.7195 -0.1923 [0.8993] (0.0001)* 
Turkey + + + + - + - - + 3 
-0.7232 -0.2484 -0.4313 -0.4556 -0.976 -0.7149 -0.2663 -0.6463 -0.636 
UK - + + - - - - - - 6 
-0.1964 -0.9933 -0.2774 -0.2574 [0.0817]* [0.5171] (0.0439)* (0.0038)* [0.0007]* 
US - + - + - - - + - 5 
[0.2156] -0.2504 [0.4804] [0.0523]* -0.1056 -0.2495 [0.1315] [0.6694] -0.219 
Venezuela + _ _ _ _ + + - 5 





zero 30 33 23 32 34 28 39 40 42 
Note, (i) "+" means E(/(D - E(J(f 國)X) and “ means E(Jt广)-E("/，< 0. (ii) Number in the blanket 0 is the 
p-value of the t-statistics of hypothesis testing where the null hypothesis state that there is no difference between the 
expected synchronicity in up-markets and down-markets, E{lf) = 抓)，with equal variances assumed, (iii) While the 
square blanket [ ] is similar to that of (iv), except that the test is assuming unequal variance. This test is applied if the p-
value ofBartlett's test for equal variances provided by STAT A® program is less than 0.10. (v) In ST AT A outputs, "p-value 
=0.000" means p-value < 0.00005. 
*The p-value of the t-statistics is less than 0.10. 
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Table 5. Market synchronicity and market conditions effects for different economies 
up extrme—value up*extreme value No. of Obs. Adj. R^  
Argentina -0.30422 ‘‘ 1.923' -0.71665' 399 0.141 
[-2.29] [6.54] [-1.75] 
Australia -0.023655 1.4361' -0.22936 412 0.1227 
[-0.21] [5.57] [-0.67] 
Austria 0.16832 1.4421' -0.96356" 406 0.1011 
[1.51] [6.70] [-2.91] 
Belgium -0.0058092 1.6734" -0.35454 406 0.1581 
[-0.05] [6.90] [-1.05] 
Brazil -0.23282' 2.1514'' -0.63143 412 0.164 
[-1.77] [6.55] [-1.54] 
Canada -0.34833' 1.6564' -0.70468^ 416 0.1354 
[-2.97] [6.32] [-2.03] 
Chile -0.36758" 1 . 6 5 i r -0.28901 411 0.1552 
[-2.97] [6.27] [-0.80] 
China -0.26234' 1.4228" -0.26914 349 0.0808 
[-1.74] [4.30] [-0.57] 
Denmark -0.038591 1.2197" -0.80676� 252 0.0575 
[-0.24] [3.99] [-1.75] 
Egypt -0.38547' 0.73639' 0.61804 247 0.095 
[-2.55] [2.16] [1.38] 
Finland -0.18436 0.96323' 0.25876 405 0.0864 
[-1.53] [3.74] [0.74] 
France -0.06293 2.0016' -1.5344" 415 0.1339 
[-0.53] [7.75] [-4.41] 
Germany -0.47766' 1.5416' -0.87763 ^ 416 0.1236 
[-3.68] [5.92] [-2.32] 
Greece -0.20673 2.1598' -0.11348 413 0.1737 
[-1.38] [6.52] [-0.25] 
Hong Kong -0.68104^ 1.1785' -0.31973 416 0.0979 
[-4.59] [3.99] [-0.74] 
Hungary -0.2646" 1.4315' 0.17959 392 0.1426 
[-2.14] [4.62] [0.46] 
India -0.49593' 1.7688' -0.21516 415 0.149 
[-3.49] [5.94] [-0.52] 
Indonesia -0.52692^ 1.7157'' -0.48399 413 0.1484 
[-3.85] [6.29] [-1.24] 
Ireland -0.0001441 1.9265" -0.88759^ 405 0.1314 
[0.00] [6.57] [-2.38] 
Israel -0.1831 2.0545" -0.25748 397 0.1538 
[-1.31] [6.42] [-0.56] 
Italy -0.12879 2.0836' -0.82615'' 416 0.1387 
[-0.93] [6.96] [-2.02] 
Japan -0.24983' 0.83417' 0.10736 417 0.1025 
[-2.73] [4.56] [0.40] 
{Continued on next page) 
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Table 5. {Continued) 
up extrme—value up*extreme_value No. of Obs. Adj. R^ 
South Korea -0.17401 1.1555' -0.091063 416 0.0598 
[-1.22] [3.80] [-0.22] 
Malaysia -0.24397 2.0552' -0.56807 416 0.1354 
[-1.62] [6.40] [-1.30] 
Mexico -0.49279' 1.1219' 0.059069 409 0.1004 
[-3.74] [3.81] [0.15] 
Netherlands -0.24072^ 1.616' -0.56924 411 0.1254 
[-1.93] [6.13] [-1.56] 
New Zealand -0.2496 ‘‘ 1.0997' 0.32052 409 0.1115 
[-2.04] [4.09] [0.90] 
Norway -0.20799 2.1608' -0.90108' 256 0.2036 
[-1.32] [7.06] [-1.95] 
Pakistan -0.50055" 2.0046" -0.23538 410 0.2285 
[-4.01] [7.76] [-0.65] 
Peru -0.25115 e 1.0291' 0.072528 399 0.0711 
[-1.96] [3.61] [0.19] 
Philippines -0.56975' 1.722' -0.76657" 416 0.1781 
[-4.44] [7.24] [-2.03] 
Poland -0.13277 2.0618' -0.27772 342 0.1681 
[-0.91] [6.23] [-0.61] 
Portugal -0.23323' 1.345' -0.3729 407 0.0946 
[-1.89] [5.08] [-1.04] 
Singapore -0.36122' 1.6002' 0.072874 414 0.1205 
[-2.36] [5.33] [0.17] 
South Africa -0.22584' 1.6475' -0.59051 311 0.1624 
[-1.81] [6.38] [-1.61] 
Spain -0.27915b 1.8599a -0.43541 412 0.1636 
[-2.23] [6.63] [-1.17] 
Sweden -0.36239" 2.0973' -0.66843 e 414 0.1893 
[-2.92] [7.35] [-1.80] 
Switzerland -0.017054 1.9797' -1.4774 a 412 0.1194 
[-0.14] [7.22] [-4.03] 
Taiwan -0.39341 ‘ 1.7865' 0.3704 412 0.1817 
[-2.73] [6.35] [0.87] 
Thailand -0.55327' 1.8102' -0.63545� 417 0.167 
[-4.36] [6.70] [-1.73] 
Turkey -0.082598 2.9491 ‘ -0.63569 400 0.235 
[-0.56] [7.09] [-1.29] 
UK -0.333b 1.4213a -0.89756b 0.0911 
[-2.52] [5.41] [-2.31] 
United States -0.11796 1.8047' -0.64039� 416 0.1359 
[-0.99] [6.28] [-1.78] 
Venezuela -0.22983� -0.36637 1.4231 b 351 0.043 
[-1.78] [-0.71] [2.47] 
Notes. 1. The dependent variable is I t f . 2. Constant is estimated but not reported. 3. The numbers in the brackets 
[.]are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 4. Numbers of observations are different due to missing data. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level; ''Significant at the 1 percent level; 'Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 6. Variable definition and predicted effect on firm-level synchronicity 
Predict effect of the 
variable on Firm-
Variablc Definition level Synchronicity 
Ownership Largest shareholder's ultimate cash flow stake 
conc. (5% (ownership concentration): 
cutoff) 
If an investor owns 25% of Firm X that owns 
20% of Firm Y，then this investor owns 5% of -
the cash-flow rights of Firm Y (the product of 
the ownership stakes along the chain) and 
controls 20% of Firm Y (the weakest link 
along the control chain). 
Cash/ control Ratio of cash flow to control rights. , 
rigM 
Cross-holdings Firm Y is controlled by a cross-holding at the 
(10% cutoff) 10% (or 20%) threshold if Firm X holds a 
stake in Firm Y of at least 10% (or 20%), and 
Y holds a stake in Firm X of at least 10% (or 
20%)，or if firm Y holds directly at least 10% 
(or 20%) of its own stocks. 
Shareholder A controlling shareholder is said to be 
alone "alone" if no other owner controls at least -f/-
10% of the voting rights. 
Management A member of the controlling family is said to 
be in "management" if he/she is the CEO, + 
Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or Vice-
Chairman. 
Dual class Dual-class share structure: Dummy = 1 if the 
share firm has outstanding non-voting, limited +/-
voting or multiple voting shares. 
Leverage Total Debt/ Total Asset + / . 
Firm size Logarithm of Asset value in terms of US 
dollar 
Cross-holdings Firm Y is controlled by a cross-holding at the 
(10% cutoff) 10% (or 20%) threshold if Firm X holds a 
stake in Firm Y of at least 10% (or 20%)，and , 
Y holds a stake in Firm X of at least 10% (or 卜 
20%), or if firm Y holds directly at least 10% 
(or 20%) of its own stocks. 
Pyramids A Dummy Variable if the Firm is Controlled 
through a Pyramid Structure + / . 
Family group A Dummy Variable for Family Group 
Affiliation identified by Classens, Djankov +/_ 
and Lang. (2000) 
Diversification Number of Industry Segments, where a 
Segment must Account for at Least 10% of +/_ 
Sales Revenue 
Year of The Year of Establishment (Not Listing) + 
Establishment 
Note: “+，，("-) means that we predict the relationship between the variable and firm-
level synchronicity is positive (negative). And “+/-“ means the relationship is ambiguous. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. Average Firm-Level Synchronicity {FLS) by type of owner (5% cutoff) and Economy 
Widely-
Widely- Held 
Dispersed Held Financial 
Country Ownership Company Institution Family State Total 
Hong Kong Mean N.A. 0.61371289 0.5937027 0.64677772 0.6011393 0.63738453 
no. of obs. 0 35 10 154 5 204 
Indonesia Mean N.A. 0.57755715 0.6836623 0.63296101 0.53656632 0.61820555 
no. of obs. 0 16 2 85 9 112 
Japan Mean 0.6039196 0.70993112 0.720742 0.66877567 0.69074913 0.71392273 
no. of obs. 4 14 517 63 8 606 
Korea Mean N.A. 0.69299655 0.6748125 0.6955504 0.65484083 0.69133676 
no. of obs. 0 21 13 112 8 154 
Malaysia Mean N.A. 0.62945321 0.7336792 0.67401682 0.62682396 0.6663371 
no. of obs. 0 10 4 121 21 156 
Philippines Mean N.A. 0.60178021 0.6789169 0.64402448 0.63009357 0.63160412 
no. of obs. 0 24 4 43 5 76 
Singapore Mean N.A. 0.67811349 0.6417053 0.67198608 0.65433577 0.66539659 
no. of obs. 0 9 5 56 33 103 
Taiwan Mean N.A. 0.68828748 0.7200052 0.68806907 0.65327994 0.69210842 
no. of obs. 0 23 15 53 3 94 
Thailand Mean N.A. 0.62975693 0.6408251 0.67944011 0.75685692 0.68010499 
no. of obs. 0 U 7 W 12 94 
All country Mean 0.6039196 0.64293172 0.7155031 0.66612355 0.64950468 0.68032702 
no. of obs. I 4 164 577 104 1599 
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Table 9. Firm-level synchronicity and the largest shareholder's ownership in Europe, overall sample 
Excluding 
Non- Austria, 
Excluding financial Norway & 
All firms U K Firms Switzerland 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ownership conc. -0.00183^ -0.00237'' -0.002171 & -0.00274^ -0.002558^ -0.0012175。 
[-3.01] [-3.18] [-3.42] [-2.89] [-3.07] [-1.69] 
Control rights minus •0.003698 b 
Cash flow rights [-2.19] 
Cash/control right 0.0091136 0.10458= 0.14244'= 0.15841 b 0.0036573 
[0.17] [1.7] [1.79] [2.34] [0.06] 
Leverage -0.1781'' -0.18091'' -0.18681^ -0.18032^ -0.24091 ® -0.26668 ^  -0.10533 
[-2.07] [-2.02] [-2.1] [-2.1] [-2.06] [-2.61] [-1.13] 
Firm size 0.046377^ 0.051169^ 0.047393^ 0.046192^ 0.051688^ 0.053276^ 0.045301 ^  
[7.35] [8.04] [7.28] [7.34] [6.00] [6.82] [7.37] 
Constant -0.05049 -0.17294 e -0.12903 -0.021477 -0.15201 e -0.22238'' -0.10433 
[-0.57] [-1.69] [-1.25] [-0.24] [-1.07] [-1.87] [-1.06] 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 1384 1255 1255 1384 831 1066 1092 
Adjusted i?-square 0.1886 0.17 0.177 0.1918 0.1983 0.1717 0.1611 
Notes. 1. The dependent variable is Isf. 2. The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 3. Numbers of 
observations are different due to missing data. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
''Significant at the 5 percent level. 
"Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 10. Firm-level synchronicity and the largest shareholder's ownership in Western Europe, by economy 
Correlation 
Cash flow between 
right to cash flow 
Ownership control right and 
conc. (5% right (5% Number of cash right to 
Economy cutoff) cutofQ Leverage Firm size Constant Observations/?^  control right 
Austria -0.0074324'' 0.53667® -0.37041 0.078986 b -0.5868505 46 0.325 0.6635 
[-2.51] [1.99] [-1.55] [2.11 ] [-1.09] 
Belgium 0.0080318 -0.42233 -1.1783 0.082467 0.26227 15 0.376 0.9259 
[0.50] [-0.56] [-1.79] [1.37] [0.26] 
Finland 0.0001059 -0.12045 0.041997 0.075591*" -0.2033 56 0.124 0.4559 
[0.04] [-0.33] [0.13] [2.43] [-0.35] 
France -0.0019002 0.16361 -0.10337 0.035853" -0.13932 144 0.058 0.4573 
[-1.11] [0.70] [-0.45] [2.07] [-0.43] 
Germany -0.0006118 0.022974 -0.1882391 0.030143" -0.046379 272 0.034 0.6129 
[-0.45] [0.19] [-0.92] [2.64] [-0.24] 
Ireland -0.0025563 0.31328 2.1443' 0.11944 -1.3705 10 0.463 0.64 
[-0.28] [0.50] [2.02] [1.88] [-1.25] 
Italy -0.0030646 -0.3074 -0.017473 0.10448" -0.50426 47 0.483 0.8149 
[-0.51] [-0.75] [-0.04] [4.18] [-1.15] 
Norway -0.013693" 0.52923-0.022511 0.014343 0.22819 49 0.173 0.5926 
[-2.81] [2.42] [-0.06] [0.35] [0.43] 
Portugal 0.0034369 -0.42322 -0.18394 0.13669 -0.91129 18 0.188 0.5531 
[0.61] [-1.41] [-0.31] [1.60] [-0.92] 
Spain -0.0080784 -0.04039 0.25009 0.15253" -1.3304 b 50 0.267 0.327 
[-1.46] [-0.09] [0.40] [4.93] [-2.60] 
Sweden -0.0031538 -0.0505 -0.0617781 0.02266 0.3227 56 0.056 0.535 
[-0.84] [-0.34] [-0.12] [0.67] [0.68] 
Switzerland -0.01407” 0.7627 -0.97871 0.093317 -0.1464517 68 0.119 0.4689 
[-2.30] [1.65] [-1.34] [1.30] [-0.13] 
U K -0.0014606 0.040465 -0.064289 0.0378965' -0.0815859 424 0.04 0.3851 
r-1.27] [0.42] [-0.48] [3-801 [-0-55] 
Notes. I. The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 2. Numbers of observations are different due to 
missing data. 
'Significant at the 1 percent level. 
''Significant at the 5 percent level. 
'Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 11. Firm-level synchronicity and corporate governance related variables in Western Europe 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cash flow right -0.00212" 
(5% cutoff) [-2.83] 
Cash to Control 0.06933 
(5% cutoff) [1.10] 
Cash -0.0019 -0.0024» -0.002® 
(10% cutoff) [-1.38] [-2.89] [-2.87] 
Cash to Control 0.0872 0.11955 = 0.1213'= 
(10% cutoff) [0.62] [1.8] [1.82] 
Cross holding -0.1396 -0.166 
(10% cutoff) [-1-13] [-1.28] 
Shareholder alone 0.0165 0.02977 
(10% cutoff) [0.59] [1.06] 
Management 0.02797 0.0399 
(10% cutoff) [0.54] [0.76] 
Dual class share -0.05342 -0.04462 
[-1.64] [-1.29] 
Leverage -0.16255^ -0.16223" -0.22314] -0.2298 -0.2105" -0.2184" -0.214" -0.224" 
[-1.86] [-1.80] [-1.26] [-1.30] [-2.27] [-2.36] [-2.32] [-2.44] 
Firm size 0.0549" 0.04963" 0.04832" 0.0473" 0.0498' 0.04681' 0.05074" 0.0478" 
[8.73] [7.32] [3.33] [3.19] [7.4] [6.58] [7.48] [6.75] 
Constant -0.20262" -0.13165 -0.1676 -0.1709 -0.1637 -0.1538 -0.1632" -0.15 
[-2.56] [-1.25] [-0.95] [-0.75] [-1.87] [-1.4] [-1.88] [-1.37] 
R.sq 0.1882 0.1788 0.1725 0.1725 0.1617 0.1674 0.1603 0.1676 
Number of observations 1350 1217 376 376 1169 1169 1170 1169 
Notes. Country dummies and owner type dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. 2. The numbers in the 
brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 3. Numbers of observations are different due to missing data. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
"•Significant at the 5 percent level. 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13. Firm-level synchronicity and the largest shareholders ownership in East Asia, by economy 
Panel A. Results that employing all data 
F-test for 
Ownership Cash/Control Owner type No. of 
conc. right Leverage Firm size constant dummy Obs. Adj-i?^  
Hong Kong 0.0067868" -0.24734" -0.26983 0.1764985" -1.5933' 3.35 204 0.4335 
[3.06] [-2.12] [-1.62] [10.14] [-5.81] 
Indonesia -0.005069 0.34517 -0.31251 0.0234213 0.19189 4.574 112 0.0847 
[-1.26] [1.57] [-1.31] [0.99] [0.63] 
Japan -0.001434 -0.023725 0.39398" -0.0127545 1.0242" 3.86 606 0.0781 
[-0.48] [-0.45] [4.77] [-1.36] [7.66] 
Korea -0.004147 0.043052 0.34349" -0.0895539 a 1.9077 ^  0.023 154 0.0808 
[-1.45] [0.32] [3.07] [-3.99] [5.70] 
Malaysia 0.0001106 0.27029 0.54614=* -0.0934731" 1.5541 a 2.697 156 0.2018 
[0.04] [1.57] [2.85] [-4.29] [4.86] 
Philippine 0.0015546 0.091795 0.11314 0.0256997 0.1022 0.811 76 -0.039 
[0.36] [0.31] [0.38] [0.89] [0.26] 
Singapore 0.0018877 0.36849 0.49418 -0.0251297 0.60481 0.509 103 0.0236 
[0.33] [1.4] [1.63] [-0.75] [1.21] 
Taiwan 0.0062309 -0.11611 -0.27595 0.1140795'' -0.62091 2.673 94 0.0826 
[1.34] [-0.49] [-0.88] [3.09] [-1.15] 
Thailand 0.0076464" -0.393181 0.4372" 0.1008153" -0.54275 2.575 94 0.2876 
[2.241 [-1.67] [2.42] [4.081 [-1-62] 
Panel B. Results that employing data that potential influential data are removed 
Owner 
Ownership Cash/Control type No. of 
cone. right Leverage Firm size constant dummy Obs. Adj-R2 
Hong Kong 0.0073173^ -0.259272" -0.39825" 0.1917626" -1.74139" Yes 202 0.4739 
[3.38] [-2.27] [-2.70] [12.57] [-7.04] 
Indonesia -0.003706 0.3070339 -0.306603 0.0626847^ -0.60738 Yes 110 0.0883 
[-1.07] [1.55] [-1.37] [2.26] [-1.65] 
Japan -0.003154 -0.010854 0.418602'' -0.014844 1.198414^ Yes 605 0.0845 
[-1.16] [-0.21] [5.24] [-1.61] [5.40] 
Korea -0.004147 0.0430516 0.343489"' -0.0895539'' 1.932768" Yes 154 0.0808 
[-1.45] [0.32] [3.07] [-3.99] [4.96] 
Malaysia -0.00015 0.2138394 0.489392" -0.1075216' 1.661927" Yes 155 0.2294 
[-0.05] [1.30] [2.64] [-5.95] [6.09] 
Philippine 0.0004193 -0.050551 0.012749 0.0436547= -0.01514 Yes 74 -0.03 
[0.10] [-0.20] [0.04] [1.71] [-0.04] 
Singapore 0.0043354 0.316314 0.452615 -0.0454489 0.955608' Yes 100 0.0601 
[0.88] [1.22] [1.67] [-1.49] [1.93] 
Taiwan 0.0019974 -0.085803 -0.568597'' 0.1246044" -1.18995" Yes 91 0.1436 
[0.52] [-0.41] [-2.13] [3.88] [-2.18] 
Thailand 0.0076077" -0.380238 0.467784" 0.0990786'' -0.31683 Yes 91 0.2742 
[2.191 [-1-59] [2.52] [3.98] [-0.83] 
jsjotes. 1. Owner type dummies are included but they are not reported here. 2. The numbers in the brackets are 
heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 3. Numbers of observations are different due to missing data. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
''Significant at the 5 percent level. 
S^ignificant at the 10 percent 
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Table 14. Firm-level synchronicity and corporate governance related variables in East Asia 
Panel A. Sample excluding Japan 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership conc. 0.001756 0.0018448 0.001934 0.0019341 
[1.23] [1.29] [1.35] [1.35] 
Cash/control right 0.058579 0.038488 0.030871 0.030676 
[0.82] [0.52] [0.42] [0.31] 
leverage 0.20163" 0.20653' 0.20182" 0.20618» 0.20437" 0.20866'' 0.20438 ‘ 0.20969' 
[2.59] [2.64] [2.61] [2.66] [2.63] [2.68] [2.63] [2.7] 
Firm size 0.031655® 0.030871 ‘ 0.033447" 0.032938' 0.032959" 0.032389" 0.032961 " 0.032785" 
[3.08] [3.03] [3.22] [3.19] [3.17] [3.14] [3.16] [3.17] 
Year 0.001277 0.0011018 0.0012977 0.001111 0.001311 0.001114 0.0013112 0.0011174 
[1.55] [1.37] [1.58] [1.38] [1.59] [1.38] [1.58] [1.39] 
Family group -0.04285 -0.0499 -0.03701 -0.04334 -0.037001 -0.037247 
[-1.27] [-1.53] [-1.11] [-1.33] [-1.10] [-1.12] 
Management -0.0312 -0.0315 -0.031184 -0.026831 
[-0.82] [-0.83] [-0.82] [-0.70] 
Pyramid -0.00013 -0.030174 
[0.00] [-0.91] 
Diversification 0.013222 0.012193 0.013587 0.012681 0.013528 0.012612 0.013528 0.012842 
[1.41] [1.30] [1.45] [1.36] [1.44] [1.35] [1.44] [1.37] 
Adjusted/?^ 0.0846 0.0824 0.0852 0.0837 0.0849 0.0834 0.0839 0.0832 
No. of obs. ^ 924 924 924 
Panel B. Sample including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand 
Excluding 
Philippines 
(1) (2) (3) ⑷ ⑶ (6) (7) (8) 
Ownership conc. 0.002225 0.0014235 0.0023031 0.002286 0.0023384 
[1.26] [0.74] [1.31] 1.3 [1.33] 
Cash/control right 0.070871 0.064971 0.047229 0.049257 -0.082626 
[0.78] [0.68] [0.51 0.53 [-0.64] 
Leverage 0.39308 ‘ 0.42369=' 0.38688'' 0.39265^ 0.3867 0.39267" 0.39636'' 0.38929=" 
[4.26] [4.44] [4.22] [4.29] [4.21] [4.29] [4.31] [4.28] 
Firm size -0.01902 -0.026776。 -0.015884 -0.01435 -0.01586 -0.01432 -0.014336 -0.013801 
[-1.51] [-1.92] [-1.23] [-1.12] [-1.23] [-1.12] [-1.10] [-1.07] 
Year 0.003828 ‘ 0.0019424 0.0038272" 0.003593" 0.003824'' 0.003592" 0.003948" 0.0036798" 
[3.27] [1.64] [3.27] [3.08] [3.27] [3.08] [3.37] [3.17] 
Family Group -0.055418 -0.063 -0.05764 -0.06507 -0.052311 -0.050571 
[-1.30] [-1.52] [-1.37] [-1.58] [-1.24] [-1.21] 
Management 0.012622 0.011004 0.02261 0.024717 
[0.23] [0.20] [0.41] [0.45] 
-0.090204 -0.082244 
[-1.5] [-1.95] 
Diversification 0.016755 0.016143 0.017298 0.016787 0.017377 0.016856 0.017882 0.017517 
[1.31] [1.17] [1.35] [1.31] [1.35] [1.31] [1.38] [1.36] 
Adjusted 及 2 0.121 0.1107 0.1221 0.1202 0.1204 0.1186 0.1221 0.1225 
No. of obs. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 526 526 
Notes. 1. Owner type dummies are included but they are not reported here. 2. The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust 
t -statistics. 3. Numbers of observations are different due to missing data. 
'Significant at the 1 percent level.; 
''Significant at the 5 percent level.; 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16. Firm-level synchronicity in 2000 and the largest shareholders ownership in 1996 
Panel A: Firm-level synchronicity in 2000 and the largest shareholders ownership in 1996， 
Western Europe 
Ownership 
conc. Cash/control Leverage Firm size No. of 
(1996) right (1996) (2000) (2000) Constant Obs Adj. 
Western Europe -0.0001899 0.017953 -0.03611 -0.005481 ^ 0.22743' 1156 0.0754 
as a whole* [-0.71] [0.85] [-1.24] [-2.41] [7.23] 
A u s t r i a 0.000841 0.085683 -0.07881 0.0161832 -0.15136 45 -0.0057 
[0.50] [0.57] [-0.63] [1.51] [-0.86] 
B e l g i u m -0.0082789 0.30251 -0.1144 0.0436686" -0.23479 15 0.4062 
[-1.53] [1.29] [-1.2] [1.99] [-0.77] 
F i n l a n d -0.001647 0.28317 0.078887 -0.007569 0.07179 57 0.0391 
[-1.00] [3.17] [0.74] [-0.63] [0.6] 
F r a n c e -0.0004584 0.056154 1052 0.0131262*' -0.03903 142 0.0239 
[-0.75] [0.66] [-1.47] [2.56] [-0.44] 
Germany 0.0002454 0.053779 0.012719 -0.001892 0.093565 273 -0.0054 
[0.54] [0.91] [0.18] [-0.34] [1.23] 
I r e l a n d -0.0042147 0.22901 -0.11707 0.0080402 0.072661 10 -0.1794 
[-1.62] [1.93] [-0.33] [0.33] [0.17] 
I t a l y 0.0015069 -0.094157 0.079597 0.0065104 0.19088 46 -0.0641 
[0.97] [-0.78] [0.73] [0.53] [1.06] 
Norway -0.0030544 0.088222 -0.17819 -0.005558 0.30111 b 43 0.0307 
[-1.43] [1.33] [-1.63] [-0.44] [2.00] 
P o r t u g a l -0.0057495'' 0.24968^ -0.24537 0.0734813' -0.62796^ 15 0.6216 
[-2.98] [2.32] [-0.88] [4.18] [-2.45] 
S p a i n -0.0018789 -0.031716 0.15586 -0.010674 0.35811 46 -0,0339 
[-1.17] [-0.24] [0.78] [-0.5] [1.7] 
Sweden -0.0000244 0.0039678 -0.01065�0.0000372 0.008 53 0.0161 
[-0.32] [1.21] [-1.82] [0.08] [1.51] 
S w i t z e r l a n d -0.0013392 -0.12693 -0.24157 -0.021622' 0.64036' 74 0.1574 
[-1.18] [-1.97] [-1.94] [-3.06] [5.76] 
UK -0.0005169 -0.025811 -0.03551 -0.018219' 0.43638' 337 0.0661 
�-0.84] [-0.64] [-0.71] [-5.27] [8.23] (Continued on next page) 
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Table 16. (Continued) 
Panel B: Firm-level synchronicity in 2000 and the largest shareholders ownership in 1996，East 
Asia. 
No. 
Ownership Cash/ control Leverage Firm size of 
conc. (1996) right (1996) (2000) (2000) constant Obs. Adj.i?^ 
Nine East 
A s i � . . 0.0002235 -0.0117899 0.058906' -0.001993 0.668846' 1620 0.1771 economies in 
sample [0.75] [-1.31] [4.9] [-1.06] [21.32] 
All 
economies 0.0003413 -0.0108378 0.068132" 0.0029129 0.620163' 982 0.1477 excluding 
Japan [1.01] [-0.63] [4.13] [1.16] [15.18] 
Indonesia, 
Korea, 
^a^ysja， _0.0003269 -0.0031066 0.052648' 0.0059696。0.630994' 579 0.1472 Philippines 
& Thailand [-0.76] [-0.13] [2.63] [1.67] [10.87] 
Hong Kong 0.0011445 - 0 . 0 6 9 6 0 4 2 � 0 . 0 6 9 0 3 r 0.0087672� 0.58051 a 206 0.0167 
[1.35] [-1.91] [1.71] [1.99] [9.27] 
Indonesia -0.0006591 -0.0457388 -0.04768 0.0208862'' 0.45988 & 96 0 . 0 4 6 
[-0.49] [-0.65] [-1.03] [2.36] [3.24] 
Japan -0.0008953 0.0007767 0.047215' -0.011414' 0.805105' 638 0.0457 
[-1.5] [0.07] [2.97] [-4.7] [17.08] 
Korea -0.0005605 -0.0418421 0.028124 0.0005411 0.766964^ 154 0 . 0 1 1 
[-0.9 [-1.17] [0.74] [0.11] [7.25] 
Malaysia -0.0020888' 0.073466'= 0.100028' -0.01866' 0.986944' 160 0.2044 
[-2.75] [1.79] [3.31] [-4.78] [15.53] 
Philippines 0.0013699 -0.0184777 0.022783 0.0182508 0.414746'' 82 0.0291 
[1.06] [-0.23] [0.37] [1.28] [2.36] 
Singapore 0.0014377 0.0614665 0.14724' -0.014614' 0.728491" 104 0.1812 
[1.27] [1.08] [3.19] [-1.97] [6.36] 
Taiwan -0.0007569 0.0010453 0.118072' -0.004681 0.76498' 93 0.1357 
[-1.15] [0.03] [2.92] [-1.00] [9.05] 
Thailand 0.0002821 0.0597798 0.06858 0.0220686' 0.315826' 87 0.0838 
�0.29] [0.81] [1.461 [2.851 �2.14] 
Notes. *. In panel B, Owner type dummies are included but they are not reported here. 1. The dependent variable is Isf. 2. 
The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 3. Numbers of observations are different due to 
missing data. 
'Significant at the 1 percent level.; 
•"Significant at the 5 percent level.; 
"^ Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Appendix Table 1. Skewness-kurtosis (Normality) tests for Itf^ and h/酬 of the sample countries 
Ijf^ It^ 
Joint Joint 
Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 Pr(Skewness) Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2) Prob>chi2 
Argen t i n a 0.444 0.336 1.53 0.4659 0.061 0.628 3.78 0.1507 
A u s t r a l i a 0.04 0.86 4.29 0.1169 0 0.064 15.66 0.0004 
A u s t r i a 0.637 0.532 0.62 0.7335 0.014 0.842 5.96 0.0509 
Belg ium 0.508 0.569 0.77 0.6799 0.801 0.449 0.64 0.7248 
B r a z i l 0 . 3 1 3 0 . 7 6 5 1 . 1 2 0 . 5 7 1 7 0 . 7 4 1 0 . 1 5 8 2 . 1 2 0 . 3 4 6 
Canada 0.001 0.107 11.84 0.0027 0 0.011 22.38 0 
C h i l e 0.44 0.39 1.35 0.51 0.002 0.921 8.46 0.0146 
China* 0.005 0.351 8.02 0.0182 0.693 0.059 3.77 0.152 
Columbia 0.772 0 11.31 0.0035 0.766 0 10.65 0.0049 
Denmark 0.285 0.666 1.34 0.5105 0.103 0.568 3.02 0.2207 
Egypt 0.517 0.001 9.64 0.0081 0.347 0.099 3.71 0.1568 
F i n l a nd 0.368 0.879 0.84 0.6569 0.398 0.056 4.41 0.1103 
France 0.001 0.023 14.39 0.0008 0.006 0.67 7.14 0.0282 
Germany 0 0.165 14.51 0.0007 0 0.352 14.92 0.0006 
Greece 0.017 0.24 6.72 0.0348 0.175 0.048 5.65 0.0592 
Hong Kong 0 0.081 15.09 0.0005 0 0.012 23.84 0 
Hungary 0.829 0.387 0.8 0.6694 0.973 0.175 1.87 0.3934 
I n d i a 0 0.044 22.12 0 0.003 0.326 8.69 0.013 
I ndones i a 0.004 0.332 8.51 0.0142 0.042 0.588 4.5 0.1054 
I r e l a n d 0.369 0.529 1.22 0.5433 0.603 0.85 0.31 0.8582 
I s r a e l 0.358 0.121 3.29 0.1932 0.034 0.795 4.61 0.1 
I t a l y 0.431 0.128 2.96 0.2271 0.2 0.95 1.66 0.4352 
Japan 0.428 0 12.27 0.0022 0.469 0.072 3.81 0.1489 
Korea 0 0.005 18.18 0.0001 0.259 0.927 1.3 0.523 
M a l a y s i a 0 . 0 1 9 0 . 5 2 5 5 . 8 0 . 0 5 5 0 0 . 0 6 6 1 4 . 2 6 0 . 0 0 0 8 
M e x i c o 0 . 6 6 7 0 . 9 9 3 0 . 1 9 0 . 9 1 1 6 0 . 0 2 9 0 . 7 5 5 4 . 8 9 0 . 0 8 6 7 
N e t h e r l a n d s 0 . 3 1 7 0 . 6 6 9 1 . 2 0 . 5 4 9 5 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 9 8 3 6 . 1 3 0 . 0 4 6 7 
New Zealand 0.094 0.818 2.88 0.2372 0.111 0.41 3.26 0.1961 
Norway 0.258 0.566 1.63 0.4435 0.021 0.532 5.66 0.0591 
P a k i s t a n 0 . 5 5 8 0 . 5 7 3 0 . 6 7 0 . 7 1 6 7 0 . 6 4 7 0 . 8 8 7 0 . 2 3 0 . 8 9 1 5 
Peru 0.822 0.191 1.78 0.4106 0.931 0.111 2.58 0.2754 
P h i l i p p i n e 0 . 0 7 2 0 . 7 7 8 3 . 3 5 0 . 1 8 7 2 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 7 9 6 4 . 5 2 0 . 1 0 4 5 
P o l a n d 0 . 1 4 0 . 0 4 9 5 . 9 0 . 0 5 2 3 0 . 1 6 5 0 . 0 5 2 5 . 5 8 0 . 0 6 1 5 
P o r t u g a l 0 . 5 9 3 0 . 4 6 0 . 8 4 0 . 6 5 6 9 0 . 0 7 1 0 . 0 3 5 7 . 2 1 0 . 0 2 7 2 
S i n g a p o r e 0 0 . 0 1 2 2 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 5 0 . 7 9 5 3 . 9 5 0 . 1 3 8 7 
South A f r i c a 0.033 0.913 4.58 0.1012 0.092 0.243 4.24 0.1202 
Spa in 0.328 0.041 5.17 0.0756 0.003 0.409 8.67 0.0131 
S w e d e n 0 . 0 7 5 0 . 4 4 3 3 . 8 1 0 . 1 4 9 1 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 4 3 6 9 . 4 5 0 . 0 0 8 9 
Swi t ze r l and 0.399 0.636 0.95 0.6231 0 0.19 12.32 0.0021 
T a i w a n 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 3 6 1 6 . 8 8 0 . 0 3 2 1 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 1 5 4 . 7 0 . 0 9 5 6 
Thailand 0 0 34.41 0 0 0.115 15.05 0.0005 
Turkey 0.644 0.501 0.67 0.7142 0.01 0.939 6.41 0.0405 
U n i t e d S t a t e s 0.004 0.052 10.39 0.0056 0 0 36.66 0 
UK 0.024 0.376 5.79 0.0552 0 0.014 16.52 0.0003 
V e n e z u e l a 0.52 0 32.55 0 0.687 0 17.82 0.0001 
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Appendix Table 2. Name of Associated Local Market Price Index for each country chosen for 
counting analysis 
Markets Name of Local Index in Datastream Markets Name of Local Index in Datastream 
Argentina ARGENTINA BURCAP Japan T O K Y O SE (TOPIX) 
Austrilia ASX ALL ORDINARIES Malaysia K U A L A L U M P U R COMPOSITE 
Austria WIENER BOERSE INDEX (WBI) Mexico MEXICO IPC (BOLSA) 
Belgium BEL 20 Netherlands A E X INDEX (AEX) 
Brazil BRAZIL BOVESPA New Zealand NZSX CAPITAL 40 
Canada S&P/TSX COMPOSITE INDEX Norway OSLO SE O B X 
Chile CHILE GENERAL (IGPA) Pakistan KARACHI SE 100 
China SHANGHAI SE A SHARE/ Peru LIMA SE GENERAL(IGBL) 
SHENZHEN S E A SHARE Philippines PHILIPPINES SE COMPOSITE 
Colombia COLOMBIA CSE INDEX Poland W A R S A W GENERAL INDEX 20 
Denmark C O P E N H A G E N K B X B E N C H M A R K Portugal PORTUGAL PSI 20 
Egypt EGYPT CAPITAL M A R K E T AUTH. GENERAL Singapore SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES(NEW) 
Finland H E X GENERAL South Africa FTSE/JSE ALL SHARE 
France SBF 120 South Korea K O R E A SE COMPOSITE (KOSPI) 
Germary D A X 30 P E R F O R M A N C E Spain IBEX 35 
Greece ATHENS SE GENERAL 'e' Sweden AFFARSVARLDEN GENERAL INDEX 
Hungary BUDAPEST (BUX) Switzerland SWISS M A R K E T 
Hong Kong H A N G SENG Taiwan TAIWAN SE WEIGHTED 
India INDIA BSE NATIONAL Thailand B A N G K O K S.E.T. 
Indonesia JAKARTA SE COMPOSITE Turkey ISE NATIONAL 100 
Ireland IRELAND SE OVERALL (ISEQ) U K FTSEALL SHARE 
Israel ISRAEL TA100 US S&P 500 COMPOSITE 
Italy MILAN COMIT GENERAL [Venezuela VENEZUELA SE GENERAL 
Appendix Table 3. Definitions of Price Index, Market Value and Associated Local Market Index 
in Datastream 
Types of Data Definition in Datastream Help file 
Price index — datatype (PI) The price index expresses the price of an equity as a 
percentage of its value on the base date, adjusted for capital 
changes. 
Market value / market capitalization Market value on Datastream is the share price multiplied 
-datatype (MV) by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The amount in 
issue is updated whenever new tranches of stock are issued 
or after a capital change. 
-For companies with more than one class of equity capital, 
the market value is expressed according to the individual 
issue. 
-Market value is displayed in millions of units of local 
currency. 
Associated local market price index This datatype returns time series data for the benchmark 
-datatype (LI) local price index for a given equity. 
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Appendix Table 4. Results ofWilcoxon rank-sum tests with null hypothesis that the median of广 and the median of/"*"" 
are equal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Number of 
Pooling years the 
sample difference 
using 1994- is less than 
Market 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001Data zero 
Argentina + - - - - 7 
[0.5265] [0.1748] [0.5646] [0.2809] [0.0629] [0.651] [0.0479] [0.1552] [0.0063] 
Australia - - + - + + + - - 4 
[0.471] [0.4013] [0.1886] [0.1382] [0.2761] [0.7837] [0.7634] [0.6015] [0.9074] 
Austria + + + + + + - + + 1 
[0.9926] [0.506] [0.2983] [0.3791] [0.5944] [0.9715] [0.3124] [0.6158] [0.8597] 
Belgium _ - + + - - - + - 5 
[0.1968] [0.0723] [0.7922] [0.4156] [0.5721] [0.452] [0.4548]] [0.6006] [0.4201] 
Brazil + - - - - + - - 6 
[0.0823] [0.0179] [0.3516] [0.2802] [0.2752] [0.5916] [0.4815] [0.5275] [0.1828] 
Canada - - - - - - - - - 8 
[0.4645] [0.3539] [0.0915] [0.1262] [0.0901] [0.4686] [0.6079] [0.5978] [0.0013] 
Chile - - - - - + - + - 6 
[0.6428] [0.5089] [0.1602] [0.0142] [0.08] [0.4226] [0.8636] [0.7193] [0.0261] 
China + _ + - - - + - • 5 
[0.7222] [0.4233] [0.7743] [0.2467] [0.2623] [0.3708] [0.3912] [0.3642] [0.0455] 
Colombia - + + + - + - - + 4 
[0.4587] [0.5524] [0.0678] [0.6271] [0.7008] [0.4448] [0.2534] [0.8345] [0.7489] 
Denmark + + + + - - + - + 3 
[0.0559] [0.6038] [0.206] [0.3339] [0.0083] [0.9926] [0.9925] [0.5552] [0.6215] 
Egypt N.A. N.A. + - _ - - - + 5 
N.A. N.A. [0.1831] [0.8021] [0.6763] [0.3397] [0.1035] [0.299] [0.3495] 
Finland - - + - - - - + - 6 
[0.9002] [0.3519] [0.9639] [0.6331] [0.8828] [0.3227] [0.0934] [0.6669] [0.2568] 
France _ - + - - + + - - 5 
[0.007] [0.6892] [0.1742] [0.4527] [0.1727] [0.9572] [0.9702] [0.070] [0.1044] 
Germany - ^ 
[0.1062] [0.0087] [0.5131] [0.8386] [0.0624] [0.0141] [0.1456] [0.0014] [0.000] 
Greece _ - - - + + + - - 5 
[0.3853] [0.2671] [0.1912] [0.0819] [0.1632] [0.3683] [0.6404] [0.9409] [0.3856] 
o 
Hong Kong - ° 
[0.000] [0.6382] [0.1764] [0.0179] [0.3215] [0.9009] [0.0352] [0.1894] [0.000] 
Hungary - - + - - - - - - 7 
[0.1216] [0.1417] [0.1644] [0.9379] [0.4071] [0.7279] [0.7478] [0.3621] [0.1788] 
India + - - - - - - - - 1 
[0.3714] [0.3005] [0.8324] [0.0695] [0.2979] [0.3548] [0.0025] [0.1265] [0.0013] 
Indonesia _ _ _ - - + - - - 1 
[0.020] [0.3167] [0.0501] [0.0764] [0.0845] [0.1842] [0.0125] [0.2814] [0.0002] 
Ireland _ + + + - - - - - 5 
[0.1192] [0.225] [0.4523] [0.4471] [0.0631] [0.8349] [0.4543] [0.6022] [0.4411] 
Israel + 6 
[0.1316] [0.6425] [0.0236] [0.7106] [0.5826] [0.1334] [0.0428] [0.7919] [0.0936] 
Italy - - - + + - - - - 6 
[0.5446] [0.1165] [0.3767] [0.1276] [0.6148] [0.3411] [0.8097] [0.0724] [0.3067] 
Japan + • - - + - - - - 6 
[0.7625] [0.5289] [0.3961] [0.0089] [0.3767] [0.4436] [0.1152] [0.6701] [0.0268] 
Korea (Rep. of) - + - - + - 6 
[0.9489]『0.4887] [0.4193] [0.2672] [0.7775] [0.3451 [0.2081] [0.2188] | [0.143] 
’ (Continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table 4. (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Malaysia + + - + - - - - 5 
[0.5306] [0.1757] [0.7916] [0.6648] [0.0736] [0.929] [0.1569] [0.6863] [0.4266] 
Mexico - + - - - - - 7 
[0.9269] [0.2046] [0.3602] [0.5349] [0.0029] [0.0588] [0.0505] [0.0578] [0.0009] 
Netherlands + - + - - - - - - 6 
[0.3875] [0.2468] [0.3057] [0.2167] [0.1011] [0.0215] [0.0937] [0.025] [0.0206] 
New Zealand + - - + - - + - 5 
[0.2921] [0.9398] [0.4116] [0.1822] [0.4067] [0.072] [0.4133] [0.4661] [0.2634] 
Norway - - + - - + - - - 6 
[0.5657] [0.5102] [0.7919] [0.9133] [0.0371] [0.6212] [0.3006] [0.0767] [0.0466] 
Pakistan + . - - 1 
[0.0482] [0.0009] [0.0997] [0.8157] [0.0507] [0.0344] [0.7695] [0.2145] [0.0013] 
Peru + . + . . . 6 
[0.5664] [0.378] [0.9091] [0.8116] [0.945] [0.3244] [0.0029] [0.454] [0.1977] 
Philippine + . . . - - - - 1 
[0.0068] [0.9845] [0.0175] [0.000] [0.2069] [0.4495] [0.1218] [0.7727] [0.000] 
Poland + - + + - + - - + 4 
[0.2315] [0.2843] [0.018] [0.7356] [0.7478] [0.464] [0.2577] [0.047] [0.9969] 
Portugal + - + - - - - - - 6 
[0.9843] [0.0083] [0.0201] [0.6169] [0.0955] [0.8229] [0.1829] [0.0831] [0.1291] 
Singapore ^ 
[0.1773] [0.4668] [0.1559] [0.1926] [0.5225] [0.4132] [0.1234] [0.7465] [0.0261] 
South Africa + + - - - + - - - 5 
[0.1276] [0.6996] [0.094] [0.5096] [0.021] [0.8025] [0.3644] [0.8076] [0.1429] 
Spain - - - + + - - - - 6 
[0.0987] [0.6937] [0.4132] [0.5383] [0.826] [0.0638] [0.1465] [0.2449] [0.143] 
Sweden + + + - - - - - • 5 
[0.8725] [0.210] [0.5256] [0.5087] [0.0141] [0.0882] [0.0305] [0.1462] [0.0127] 
Switzerland - ^ . . . . . 1 
[0.2308] [0.3157] [0.8681 [0.071] [0.2014] [0.8867] [0.776] [0.1012] [0.1965] 
Taiwan + + 6 
[0.1252] [0.2618] [0.2708] [0.9399] [0.428] [0.1485] [0.0681] [0.5637] [0.0096] 
Thailand - - - - - + - - - 7 
[0.0024] [0.0872] [0.0073] [0.0001] [0.3263] [0.6305] [0.3139] [0.8656] [0.000] 
Turkey + + + + + + - + + 1 
[0.7916] [0.183] [0.2753] [0.7706] [0.9612] [0.3996] [0.302] [0.939] [0.3884] 
U K - + + - - - - - - 6 
[0.1475] [0.9269] [0.3684] [0.3368] [0.0817] [0.2897] [0.0374] [0.0055] [0.0006] 
US - + - + - - - + - 5 
[ 0 . 1 6 4 2 ] [ 0 . 0 9 5 4 ] [ 0 . 7 7 2 5 ] [ 0 . 0 9 5 4 ] [ 0 . 2 0 7 9 ] [ 0 . 0 8 9 6 ] [0.3334] [0.7883] [0.2125] 
Venezuela + - - - - + + - - 5 




less than zero 30 33 23 31 34 28 39 37 39 
Note, (i) “+，’ means the rank sum of广 is larger than the rank sum of/�抓,and "-" means the opposite (n) Number in the 
blanket [ ] is the p-value of the test statistics of hypothesis testing that the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the median of synchronicity in up-markets and down-market. 
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Appendix Table 5. Descriptions of Information in the construction of Good Government Index and Anti-
dircctors rights index 
Variable Description Sources 
Antidirectors An index aggregating the shareholder rights which we labeled as Company Law or 
Rights "anti-director rights." The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the Commercial 
country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) shareholders Code 
are not required to deposit their share prior to the General 
Shareholders' Meeting; (3) cumulative voting is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; or (5) when the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting is less than or equal 
to 10% (the sample median). The index ranges from 0-5. 
Corruption ICR's assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores International 
indicate "high government officials are likely to demand special Country Risk 
payments" and illegal payments are generally expected throughout Guide 
lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with 
import and export license, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy 
protection, or loans". Average of the months of April and October of 
the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10，with 
low scores for higher levels of corruption. (We changed the scale of 
this variable from its original range from 0 to 6). 
Repudiation of ICR's assessment of the "risk of a modification in a contract taking International 
Contracts by the form of a reputation, postponement, or scaling down" due to Country Risk 
Government “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change in government, Guide 
or a change in government economic and social priorities." Average 
of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 
1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10，with lower scores for higher 
risks. 
Risk of ICR's assessment of the risk of :outright confiscation" or "forced International 
Expropriation nationalization". Average of the months of April and October of the Country Risk 
monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10，with Guide 
lower scores for higher risks. 
Note. The first column gives the name of the variable. The second column describes the variable and 
gives the range of possible values. The third column provides the sources from which the variable was 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table.7. Firm-level synchronicity and ownership structure in Western Europe 
Overall 
Western 
Europe Ownership Cash/control No. of 
Except conc. right Leverage Firm size constant Obs. Adj. R^ 
Austria -0.0022202'' 0.0943759 -0.1741616' 0.0464642=' -0.1172052 1209 0.1766 
[-2.90] [1.51] [-1.88] [7.03] [-1.11] 
Belgium -0.0023935" 0.1069618" -0.1752528' 0.0468068 a -0.1321748 1240 0.1593 
[-3.20] [1.72] [-1.95] [7.13] [-1.26] 
Finland -0.0024687 ‘ 0.1147696'= -0.1996255" 0.0461236" -0.1256646 1199 0.1751 
[-3.23] [1.85] [-2.17] [6.93] [-1.19] 
France -0.0024962 ‘ 0.1061739。 -0.1950299" 0.0487826" -0.1327306 1111 0.1839 
[-3.04] [1.65] [-2.05] [6.98] [-1.22] 
Germany -0.0035588‘‘ 0.1252805。 •0.1896656。 0.0545343 ^  -0.1689364 983 0.1848 
[-3.89] [1.80] [-1.95] [6.94] [-1.40] 
Ireland -0.0023522" 0.1002998 -0.1965834" 0.0471681 丨-0.1244058 1245 0.1721 
[-3.15] [1.62] [-2.21] [7.22] [-1.20] 
Italy -0.0022621 ® 0.1363755" -0.1935963" 0.0453137 a -0.1398375 1208 0.166 
[-3.00] [2.17] [-2.13] [6.85] [-1.33] 
Norway -0.0020956" 0.0813931 -0.1801683'' 0.0490065» -0.1426756 1206 0.1816 
[-2.78] [1.27] [-1.96] [7.41] [-1.33] 
Portugal -0.0024461" 0.1082677' -0.1836645' 0.0469594" -0.1259741 1237 0.1785 
[-3.25] [1.74] [-2.05] [7.15] [-1.20] 
Spain -0.0022428" 0.095707 -0.1912188" 0.0439681"" -0.0834925 1205 0.1781 
[-3.01] [1.54] [-2.13] [6.64] [-0.8] 
Sweden -0.0023972^ 0.11721= -0.189131” 0.0478383 ‘ -0.14513 1199 0.18 
[-3.13] [1.76] [-2.1] [7.19] [-1.37] 
Switzerland -0.0017373" 0.0470497 -0.1331486 0.044795'' -0.1071012 1187 0.156 
[-2.49] [0.85] [-1.54] [7.47] [-1.14] 
U K -0.0027407 ^  0.1424378。 -0.2409081" 0.0516877" -0.152013 831 0.1983 
r-2.891 [1.791 r-2.061 丨 6.001 丨-1.07] 
1. The dependent variable is I s f . 2. The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 3. Numbers of 
observations are different due to missing data. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
•"Significant at the 5 percent level. 
•^Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Appendix Table 8. Firm-level synchronicity and ownership structure in East Asia by economy (Industry effect removed) 




Ownership conc. Cash/Control right Leverage Firm size constant dummy N Adj R^ 
Hong Kong 0.0069217" -0.248744" -0.139 0.1595008" -1.413” 1.655 204 0.4554 
[2.97] [-2.04] [-0.89] [9.75] [-5.25] 
Indonesia -0.00456 0.3057737 -0.28897 0.0200655 -0.28 1.089 112 0.0925 
[-1.22] [1.58] [-1.30] [0.67] [-0.71] 
Japan -0.002078 -0.015334 0.419208' -0.009866 0.97796" 1.618 606 0.0903 
[-0.62] [-0.29] [4.94] [-0.90] [4.26] 
Korea -0.005161 0.0427292 0.302604'' -0.076174" 1.80465' 1.196 154 0.0954 
[-1.63] [0.3] [2.22] [-2.90] [4.34] 
Malaysia 0.0017722 0.2763442 0.544985" -0.106795" 1.53996=' 2.156 156 0.2754 
[0.62] [1.54] [2.97] [-5.12] [4.52] 
Philippine 0.0040411 0.2213045 0.102087 0.0288826 -0.181 0.672 76 -0.0975 
[0.83] [0.51] [0.29] [0.76] [-0.28] 
Singapore 0.0010629 0.1819058 0.427368 -0.01089 0.63463 1.093 103 0.0349 
[0.17] [0.74] [1.37] [-0.31] [1.09] 
Taiwan 0.0077162 -0.096801 -0.39897 0.1525042'' -1.7186" 1.131 94 0.099 
[1.82] [-0.43] [-1.03] [2.49] [-2.03] 
Thailand 0.0069166 -0.446297 0.556182 0.083302 -0.0611 0.466 94 0.225 
f-1.311 『2.51 『2.641 [-0.14] 
Panel B. Remove industry factor by excepting Petroleum, regulated utility and Miscellaneous 
Ownership conc. Cash/Control right Leverage Firm size constant N Adj-i?^  
Hong Kong 0.00642=' -0.2322" -0.1922 0.18448" -1.7221" 197 0.444 
[2.85] [-1.99] [-1.13] [10.0] [-6.05] 
Indonesia -0.0049 0.2778 -0.1651 0.01874 -0.1449 107 0.07 
[-1.29] [1.35] [-0.78] [0.67] [-0.39] 
Japan -0.0037 -0.0014 0.4286" -0.0109 1.18659'' 584 0.085 
[-1.21] [-0.03] [5.21] [-1.17] [4.51] 
Korea -0.0039 0.03617 0.32247'' -0.09" 1.89344^ 149 0.073 
[-1.23] [0.27] [2.82] [-3.74] [4.55] 
Malaysia 0.00072 0.26353 0.57402" -0.0902 ‘ 1.36366^ 150 0.191 
[0.21] [1.47] [2.92] [-4.37] [4.38] 
Philippine 0.00391 0.03921 0.11107 0.01727 0.14649 65 -0.07 
[0.86] [0.12] [0.35] [0.55] [0.34] 
Singapore 0.00326 0.34158 0.44109 -0.0196 0.51329 98 0.222 
[0.55] [1.27] [1.45] [-0.57] [0.93] 
Taiwan 0.00641 -0.1264 -0.3029 0.11595" -1.2229。 92 0.082 
[1.37] [-0.53] [-0.95] [3.10] [-1.78] 
Thailand 0.00761" -0.3802" 0.46778" -0.3168 -0.3168 91 0.274 
r-1.591 [2.521 『-0.831 [-0.83] 
1. The dependent variable is I t f . 2. The numbers in the brackets are heteroskedasticity-robust t -statistics. 
S^ignificant at the 1 percent level. 
•"Significant at the 5 percent level. 
•"Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Appendix Figure 1 • Stock Return Synchronicity and Good Government Index 
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Note: (Reproduction of Chart 3 in Dumev et al., 2003) The Good Government Index plotted 
against stock return synchronicity measured by the average fraction of individual biweekly returns 
variation explained by market indices. Each observation is for one country. Data are for 1995. 
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